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ABSTRACT
South Africa is no longer a pariah state and has been fully integrated into the global family
of nations. With the country’s accession to multilateral agreements like the World Trade
Organization (WTO), there has been pressure on the government to abandon its hitherto
protectionist trade regime in favour of free and fair trade.
Trade liberalisation has had profound implications for the country’s manufacturing sector
in general, and the automotive industry in particular, which has seen tariff protection
radically slashed and import restrictions greatly eased. Not only has the market share of
domestic producers fallen, but increases in exports have to date not matched those of
imports. As a result there has been a deterioration in the sector’s balance of trade and a
reduction in employment levels, at a time when the country desperately needs to create
new jobs. Recent developments, however, suggest that this scenario may be set to change.
The thesis applies orthodox neoclassical and heterodox approaches to trade policy to an
assessment of the likely economic impact of trade liberalisation on the automotive industry
in the Eastern Cape, and by extension nationally. The thesis argues that reliance on
orthodox trade theory to inform the direction of trade policy, especially in a developing
country context, is unlikely to bring about an adequate increase in the level of exports and
employment. This is because liberalisation of the import regime is likely to increase import
levels without necessarily stimulating export levels, a scenario which serves to negate the
presupposed benefits of liberalisation.
The study uses information from surveys conducted on both motor vehicle assemblers and
component manufacturing firms to investigate the effect of trade liberalisation on the
sector in the Province and finds that, by and large,  the motor assemblers have not fared
as badly as expected and have in fact positioned themselves to export more vehicles and
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components. The components sector has had to contend with increased competition from
cheaper imports.
The thesis, while acknowledging that, as far as possible, free trade is an optimal position,
nonetheless argues that governments still have an important role to play in the promotion
of industrialisation. The scope of government intervention should, however, be limited to
selective interventions which are aimed at counteracting market failure and facilitating
innovation and the diffusion of technological know-how. The thesis argues that institution
of supply side measures, such as the encouragement of research and development (R&D),
skills development and industrial training, is necessary for  sustained growth in the
manufacturing sector to be realised.
The thesis also finds that, contrary to expectations, the liberalisation of the automotive
sector has not had the desired effects. Despite an increase in the value of automotive
exports and an overall trend towards reduced net foreign exchange usage, employment
levels are on the decline. The thesis also finds that without major export initiatives by both
motor vehicle assemblers and component manufacturers, the future of the industry will be
placed in jeopardy, especially with reduced protection and incentives.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem Statement
Trade liberalisation is an issue that has generated immense controversy in post-1990 South
Africa, especially since the watershed political events of 1994. These almost coincided with
the country’s accession to the Uruguay Round (UR) of trade negotiations, carried out
under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which has
since transformed into the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  Some of the salient
features of the UR have included the shift from quantitative restrictions (QRs) and the
abolition of export subsidies to the manufacturing sector under the General Export
Incentive Scheme (GEIS). This is expected to cause a realignment of South Africa’s
trading patterns with the rest of the world.
Trade policy comprises those instruments which are used to influence a country’s balance
of payments (BoP) directly. Policy instruments used to achieve this goal include voluntary
export restraints (VERs) and subsidies to both imports and exports. Trade policy is widely
considered to be an instrument in attaining the goal of industrialisation, and allowing for
increased output, and thus should not be considered an end in itself. Trade liberalisation,
on the other hand, is undertaken to make a country’s trade regime neutral between
producing for the domestic market and for export. This involves among other things the
pursuit of import liberalisation, relaxation of QRs, tariff reductions and measures to
promote exports actively.
In South Africa, the period immediately after the 1960s was characterised by the pursuit
of an active import substituting industrial policy (ISI), accompanied by the promotion of
export subsidies. For the automotive industry, ISI was achieved under a series of successive
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local content programmes which aimed at increasing a vehicle’s local content, while
simultaneously steeply increasing the price of imported fully built up (FBU) vehicles. This
encouraged foreign motor manufacturers to set up assembly plants to benefit from the
captive market.
However, by becoming a signatory to the WTO Treaty, the country is duty bound to lower
both tariff and non-tariff barriers. Given that many years of protection have spawned
highly capital intensive industries which are said to lack a competitive edge internationally,
the lowering of tariff and non-tariff barriers has exposed the manufacturing industry to stiff
competition from imports. For the motor industry, this has been seen in the proliferation
of imported FBUs under the Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP).
In order to benefit from tariff reductions, it has been argued that countries, especially in
the developing world, have to shift from exporting traditional primary products to
manufactured goods. South Africa is no exception to this for, as pointed out by Bell
(1993:98) and the government’s Growth, Employment and Redistribution document
(GEAR, 1996:2), the country must significantly increase output in order to achieve
economic growth. This makes the possible effects of trade liberalisation worthy of
investigation.
1.2 Objectives of the Research
This thesis will investigate the impact of the on-going trade liberalisation on exports and
employment in the automotive industry, with particular focus on the Eastern Cape
Province. For this sector, there has been a shift in emphasis from local content programmes
to an incentive based system under the Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP),
launched in September 1995. The MIDP proposed an accelerated tariff reduction regime
in excess of that contained in South Africa’s offer to the Uruguay Round of trade
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negotiations, and which will see tariff protection for this sector fall well below WTO
bindings by the year 2002, when the present MIDP expires.
It is instructive to note that the manufacture of motor vehicles in the Eastern Cape
Province constitutes 39.9 per cent of the country’s total output of motor vehicles and
employs 24.1 per cent of the Province’s labour force (IDC, 1997d:4). The motor vehicle
sector also contributes 31.1 per cent to the Province’s Gross Geographical Product (GGP).
Motor vehicle assembly, which has hitherto been a highly protected industry, is
concentrated in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage metropolitan area, which is home to
Volkswagen of South Africa (VWSA) and Delta Motor Corporation. DaimlerChrysler
South Africa (DCSA) is located in the coastal city of East London. There is also a
significant presence of automotive component manufacturing, especially in Port Elizabeth,
where the bulk of the Province’s component manufacturers are based.
This thesis attempts to evaluate the possible impact of trade liberalisation on the growth
and structure of the Province’s motor vehicle  and component exports in relation to South
Africa’s total trade in automotive products. Most importantly, the study will make some
inferences and recommendations for policies regarding the future of the motor vehicle
industry in the Eastern Cape and, by extension, nationally. 
For the purposes of the study, the automotive sector will be taken to encompass the
assembly of vehicles principally designed to carry up to five people, and the manufacture
of parts and accessories for the same (as classified under SIC 384).
1.3 Methodology
The thesis surveys the theoretical literature on trade policy reform in developing countries,
with a particular focus on the likely static and dynamic economic effects of trade
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liberalisation. This entails, inter alia, an examination of the literature on the impact of the
UR on developing countries.
The debate on trade liberalisation revolves around two dominant perspectives, the
orthodox neo-classical approach and the heterodox revisionist approach. The neo-classical
school of thought upholds liberalisation on the grounds that it will bring about a rapid
increase in exports and employment. On the contrary, critics of this standpoint, such as
Bell (1993:114), argue that the immediate impact of trade liberalisation is likely to be
delayed and possibly weak, thus worsening the trade balance at a time when improvement
is crucial for economic recovery. Thus even if an outward looking export-oriented strategy
is pursued, there is still a case for elements of import substitution.
It is instructive to note that even the East Asian Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs),
which are today lauded as success stories for carrying out export oriented industrialisation,
in fact provided heavy protection and massive export subsidies for industries in their
nascent years of growth. As Cassim (1995:10) notes, the terms of the debate between ISI
and EOI have considerably shifted, especially in the light of problems that have tended to
emerge with the implementation of import liberalisation.
A more heterodox position has emerged which encourages an optimal policy mix of
instruments, of which import liberalisation is a part. There is also an emphasis on supply
side measures to augment the process of trade liberalisation.
The study relies on both primary and secondary data. The former are the results of surveys
conducted of both the motor vehicle assemblers and component manufacturing firms
affiliated to the National Association of Automotive Component and Allied
Manufacturers (NAACAM) in the Eastern Cape. The questionnaires used for the surveys
are based on a qualitative study conducted by Barnes (1998) on the automotive industry
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in KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Eastern Cape Province. It was envisaged that by
eliciting the views of these manufacturers, it would be possible to obtain first hand
information on the effects of trade policy reform and trade liberalisation on their business
concerns. For the purposes of the survey of component manufacturers, three non-exporting
NAACAM member firms were omitted, leaving twenty firms. It was further established
that one firm  had since shifted to the production of non-automotive items. Three firms
did not respond to the survey, and thus information from sixteen firms was used. In
addition, one motor vehicle assembler declined to participate in the survey of assembly
firms.
A qualitative as opposed to quantitative approach was adopted, largely due to the
unavailability of disaggregated data on the automotive industry. While this  opened the way
to subjective and value-laden answers, the survey nonetheless gives a fairly accurate
representation of the likely impact liberalisation has had on the automotive industry both
in the Eastern Cape and nationally.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into six main chapters. Chapter 2 outlines the genesis of the various
theories of international trade. These include the classical,  neo-classical and new trade
theories. It then provides an analysis of how these theories have influenced thinking on
trade policy reform. Attention is also devoted to the current debate on trade policy reform,
which pits adherents of the orthodox neo-classical theory against the more heterodox neo-
structuralists (revisionists).
Chapter 3 analyses the evolution of trade policies pursued in South Africa from the mid-
1920s to the present day. It focuses on the country’s efforts to move away from being an
inward-looking economy manufacturing mainly for the domestic market to a more
outward-oriented export-based regime. This is especially evident from the early 1970s to
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the mid 1990s, when the country ratified the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Treaty.
The chapter further focuses on the liberalisation efforts undertaken in the country’s motor
vehicle sector from the late 1980s, under Phase VI of the local content programme, and
more recently the Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP), which came into
effect in September 1995.
Chapter 4 takes an in-depth look at the evolution of the motor vehicle industry in South
Africa, before examining the sector in the Eastern Cape Province.  It also focuses on the
impact liberalisation under the MIDP has had on levels of exports and employment. 
Chapter 5 presents and analyses the information obtained from the surveys of both the
motor vehicle assemblers and component manufacturers and makes inferences for the
future of the industry in the Province and nationally.
Chapter 6 summarises the arguments for and against liberalisation in the motor vehicle
sector, before drawing conclusions for policy.
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CHAPTER 2
INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY, POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS
AND THE TRADE POLICY REFORM DEBATE
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter outlines the genesis of the various theories of international trade from the
nineteenth  century to the present day. It examines how these  theories have evolved and
the way they have influenced thinking on trade policy in developing countries. Trade policy
reform has gained much prominence in the 1980s and 1990s, mainly at the insistence of the
Bretton Woods institutions, which impose it as a condition for balance of payments support
and as part of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs).
2.2 Theories of International Trade
2.2.1 The Classical Theory of International Trade
The basic tenets of international trade theory can be traced to the writings of classical
economists such as Adam Smith (1776), David Ricardo (1817) and  John Stuart Mill (1848),
whose contributions to economic theory are still acknowledged to the present day.
According to the classical economists, countries trade because they are inherently
different from one another, and they can benefit from these differences (Krugman and
Obstfeld, 1997:13).
To demonstrate the gains that would accrue to a country from engaging in international
trade, Adam Smith used a two country, two good model to propound the theory of absolute
advantage. Based on the assumption that there was one factor of production, labour, which
was perfectly mobile within nations but perfectly immobile between nations, he argued that
a country stood to gain from international trade by specialising in the production of that
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commodity which used fewer units of labour per unit of output. If the other country used
fewer units of labour to produce the other commodity and specialised in its production, and
assuming that surpluses in both countries were traded, then it followed that both countries
would end up being better off.
The concept of absolute advantage was later refined by Ricardo, who introduced the notion
of comparative advantage (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1997:15). This holds that even if one
country has an absolute advantage in the production of both commodities, it would still be
beneficial for the two countries to trade if one of them had a comparative advantage in the
production of a particular commodity, that is, the opportunity cost of producing one unit
of a commodity was lower.
As Myint (1958:318) notes, the theory of comparative advantage thus involves
specialisation, with countries moving along a static production possibilities boundary based
on given resources, the comparative advantage in question being determined by differences
in technology. By specialisation, labour would move costlessly from one industry to another
(but not between countries), leaving both countries better off by engaging in mutual and
free trade. This is in stark contrast to the mercantilists, who measured a country’s wealth
by its store of precious metals. While they felt that accumulating precious metals  through
trade was advantageous, they frowned upon any reduction in the reserves of these metals,
hence they advocated restricted trade.
2.2.2 The Neo-Classical Theory of International Trade
Neo-classical trade theory is a refinement of the classical comparative advantage approach,
and was formalised by the Swedish economists Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin (Winters,
1991:31). Their Heckscher-Ohlin variable proportions model focuses specifically  on the
differences in factor endowment between countries which results in diverse commodities
being produced in different countries.
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According to Sodersten and Reed (1994:66), the assumptions underlying the  the
Heckscher-Ohlin model are:
(i) absence of transport costs and other impediments to trade;
(ii) perfect competition in both product and factor markets (and by implication absence
of scale economies; homogeneity of technology between firms and countries; and
known, automatic and predictable learning processes);
(iii) production functions differ between commodities but are the same for both
countries;
(iv) capital and labour are perfectly mobile  between industries in the same country but
perfectly immobile across national boundaries;
(v) there are no factor intensity reversals.
Capital abundant countries would thus specialise in the production of capital-intensive
goods whereas labour abundant countries would specialise in the production of labour-
intensive commodities. Through international trade, a country would alleviate factor
shortages through the importation of commodities requiring larger amounts of its relatively
scarce factor.
The conclusions that can be drawn from this model are that for internationally traded
goods and services, efficient allocation of resources is determined by the marginal
productivities of factors at internationally traded prices. This is achieved via the unfettered
operation of the market system, with prices acting to allocate resources according to
comparative advantage.
Secondly, given that increasing domestic resource costs cause domestic prices to exceed
world prices, the notion of factor price equalisation comes into play. The idea of factor price
1A detailed treatment of the Leontief paradox is beyond the scope of this chapter. The interested reader is referred to
Leontief (1953).
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equalisation assumes that free trade between nations in the Heckscher-Ohlin model will
equate factor prices between nations, provided neither country specialises fully in the
production of a commodity. This situation arises when the price of the factor needed to
produce a commodity in one country increases with rising production, bidding up its relative
price. With the price of the abundant factor in each country rising, international trade
would ultimately equalise these prices in both countries.
The basic policy prescriptions flowing from neo-classical trade theory are that the best
allocation of resources is achieved by:
(i) the removal of domestic market distortions such as government intervention or
other institutional rigidities which prevent efficient market operations;
(ii) liberalisation of international trade and foreign exchange markets, enabling
economies to function as closely as possible to a free-market regime.
Not unlike the classical theory of international trade, the limitations of neo-classical theory
mainly arise from its static equilibrium analysis. This ignores potential dynamic benefits of
international trade such as increased growth over time, as a result of increasing propensity
to save and the rate of technological progress. As Lall (1994a:68) points out, some of these
assumptions also mean that some critical areas of market failure are ignored.
The major empirical critique of neo-classical trade theory is to be found in the Leontief
paradox. Named after Nobel laureate Wassily Leontief, this paradox established that for
the United States, a capital abundant country, the balance of trade was biased in favour
of capital intensive imports, contrary to expectations. Several explanations are offered for
this phenomenon.1 One popular explanation, for instance, is that this paradox was observed
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because the United States had a special advantage in high technology exports, which relied
heavily on skilled labour and innovative entrepreneurial skills. Its imports, on the contrary,
relied on technologies which had diffused widely and  could thus use large amounts of
capital (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1997:82).
Krugman and Obstfeld (1997:85) argue, however, that whereas the Heckscher-Ohlin model
has not been as successful in providing explanations for actual patterns of international
trade, it nonetheless remains crucial as a means of understanding the effects of trade,
especially the distribution of income. With increasing North-South trade in manufactured
commodities, the factor proportions theory has been firmly thrust into the centre of debates
on international trade policy.
2.2.3 New Trade Theories
The 1980s have seen a rise in prominence of what are collectively known as new trade
theories, largely due to the inability of conventional trade theories to explain the volume
and composition of trade, and the pervasive presence of imperfect competition. Krugman
(1989:348) sees these new trade theories as a fusion of industrial organisation theory and
the conventional idea that trade results from specialisation and the pursuit of scale
economies. Imperfect competition encompasses increasing returns to scale, product
differentiation, intra-firm and intra-industry trade, which are strong features of worldwide
trading patterns. New trade theories also incorporate neo-technology models which focus
on the dynamic effects of trade, and the link between trade, technology and growth
(Greenaway, 1991:158). Various authors have tried to formalise models which incorporate
these features, in an attempt to address the shortcomings of conventional trade theories.
With regard to imperfect competition, the models of increasing returns to scale (IRTS)
assume that economies of scale are internal to firms. Trade, therefore, need not be a result
of differences in technology or factor endowments, but rather a way of expanding the
2For a detailed treatment of Linder’s thesis, see Linder (1961).
3Cited in Winters (1991:67).
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market and allowing for the exploitation of scale economies. Intra-industry trade, which
involves the simultaneous import and export of the same good, takes place largely because
countries with similar factor endowments still trade due to the existence of economies of
scale in production. It also mainly occurs in products manufactured with similar factor
proportions. The models embodying product differentiation assume that there are
economies of scale in production and that the differentiation of products at firm level is
costless. Winters (1991:62) describes differentiation of products as either cosmetic or
functional, with different varieties being sought by consumers.
The main assumptions underlying trade in differentiated products are the existence of
demand for several varieties and the presence of economies of scale which hinders the
effective satisfaction of this demand. Winters (1991:63) notes that, as a result of imperfect
competition, firms face downward sloping demand curves, but earn normal profits due to
the free entry of competitors into the industry. However, gains from trade between two
economies may still take place despite identical tastes, technology and factor endowments.
Another determinant of intra-industry trade, identified by Linder (1961)2, is per capita
income. With income as a major determinant of tastes, wealthier individuals demand
better goods for which they are willing to pay a higher price. In the presence of trade, more
varieties are purchased from other rich countries than poorer countries, hence more intra-
industry trade occurs between countries with almost similar per capita incomes3.
Neo-technology models highlight differences in technological capabilities between
countries, and how these differences affect international patterns of trade and growth.
Dosi et  al. (1990:3) define technological capabilities as the skills and knowledge necessary
to develop, produce and sell products. Innovativeness refers to the actual realisation of that
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capacity to generate and commercialise new and better products and production processes.
Dosi et al. (1990:3) treat technology as an endogenous variable which is firm-specific, tacit
in nature and cumulative in its development. They see it as strongly dependent on
investment and production, and contend that technical choices at firm-level are
discretionary and non-optimal, given the impossibility of foreseeing the nature and
likelihood of all possible future technological and market developments (Dosi et al., 1990:9).
Neo-technology theories emphasise the notion of increasing returns, particularly those
associated with production and technology, and develop a model based on international
technology gaps, which reflect superior and inferior techniques. These technology gaps,
which are synonymous with Ricardo’s comparative advantages, are important in explaining
the participation of each country in international trade flows and international differences
in income levels.   Dosi et al. (1990:11) see comparative advantage as resulting not from
endowment but rather the learning process (innovation, imitation and organisational
change) which is sector and country specific.
This model illustrates how international technology gaps are instrumental in the
determination of specialisation and macro-economic activity, and establishes that the
evolution of innovative/imitative capabilities in each country is responsible for shaping the
trend in relative and absolute growth rates of the tradeable sector. 
With regard to policy prescriptions, the new trade theories which emphasise imperfect
competition have led to two main arguments, which can be classified as the external
economies and strategic trade policy (rent-snatching) arguments. As Greenaway (1991:165)
and Alam (1995:369) note, the former is based on the notion that beneficial spillover effects
exist in an industry. If these benefits are unpriced, then reliance on market effects results
in under provision of the good or service in question. This justifies the need for government
intervention on the ground that these industries would otherwise not exist. Krugman
(1992:435) points out that if through temporary protection an industry can be created that
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would otherwise not have existed, then the higher earnings from the factors in that industry
can compensate for any short-term distortions. This argument is further reinforced if
positive externalities  between industries are presupposed.
The strategic trade policy (rent-snatching) argument recognises the oligopolistic nature of
world competition, with the resulting markets being concentrated and characterised by the
presence of rents (Greenaway, 1991:162). Rents are defined as payments to a resource
owner, which are over and above the amount those resources could command in their next
best alternative use. Strategic trade policy suggests that, by government intervention,
national welfare can be increased by competing those rents away from foreign to domestic
firms. According to Gilpin and Gilpin (1987:186), strategic trade policy uses  export
subsidies (which are tantamount to investment in excess capacity) and entry barriers, and
therefore harnesses domestic demand. This would make home firms gain the scale
economies that allow them to compete in, and dominate,  world markets.
Neo-technologists, on the other hand, argue that free trade is best suited for technological
dynamism and growth within established technological patterns, particularly for countries
on or near the technological frontier.
The question as to whether new trade theories reinforce the case for free trade or not is
highly controversial (see, for example, Krugman, 1989, 1992; Alam, 1995). On the one hand
they are perceived to uphold open trade policy.  Greenaway (1991:168) argues, for instance,
that caution must be exercised in postulating arguments for protection. This is largely
because protection more often than not results in increased rent-seeking behaviour as
opposed to industry expansion. He instead argues for first best interventions such as
production subsidies and training subsidies, as opposed to direct protection.  
2.3 The Trade Policy Debate
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Section 2.2 distinguished the different trade theories and the way they have influenced
thinking on policy prescriptions. This section will go a step further and attempt to provide
an insight into the different orientations trade policy has taken over the years, especially
in the twentieth century.
2.3.1 The Structuralist Approach to Trade Policy
Structuralism emerged in response to the difficult economic period of the mid- 1930s and
early 1940s (the Great Depression and World War II),  with some of its more prominent
advocates including Prebisch (1950), Singer (1950) and Cheneris and Bruno (1962). The
essence of structuralism should be understood in the context of a core-periphery
relationship between developed and developing countries. According to Prebisch
(1984:176), at the centre of the  “economic constellation” lay industrialised countries,
favoured by their earlier technological progress, which facilitated the organisation of the
system to suit their own interests. Producers of primary products and raw material exporters
were linked to this centre by virtue of their natural resources, forming a vast and
heterogeneous periphery incorporated in the system in different ways and to different
extents.
According to Krueger (1997:3-4), the following stylised facts were often used to describe
developing countries:
(i) a heavy orientation towards the production of primary commodities;
(ii) a belief that the adoption of free trade policies would see their comparative
advantage forever lie in primary production;
(iii) the global price and income elasticities of demand for primary products were low,
hence export earnings would not grow rapidly, if at all;
(iv) the existence of a labour force mainly engaged in agricultural production; this labour
force was perceived to have a marginal productivity of labour of zero or less;
-16-
(v) the belief that capital accumulation, which was crucial for growth, could only occur
with the importation of capital goods;
(vi) the ineffectiveness of price incentives owing to structural problems within the
economy.
It was the contention of structuralists that the price system as perceived by neo-classical
theorists did not function in accordance with the perfectly competitive model, hence
rendering it largely inapplicable to developing countries. According to Greenaway and
Milner (1993:45), at the heart of the structuralist case was widespread market failure,
which rendered the price system insignificant, and even misleading. Market failure was the
culmination of many factors, ranging from capital market imperfections to production
externalities and even the complete absence of some markets.
Fishlow (1984:192) adds that market imperfections were exemplified by monopolies in the
centre and/or segmented capital markets in the periphery, which caused excessively high
prices of manufactured goods and excessive production of low priced primary exports.
Structuralists therefore stressed the need to shift from reliance on international trade and
primary products to domestic industrialisation. Structuralists advocated domestic import-
substituting industrialisation (ISI) as an alternative engine of growth. This would help
counteract the tendency towards a foreign exchange constraint on development, which
arose from a high income elasticity of demand for goods from the centre, compared with a
low income elasticity of demand from the periphery (Prebisch, 1984:179). According to
Kirkpatrick (1987:73), producing for the domestic market also had the undeniable
psychological appeal of demonstrating an ability to produce something for oneself rather
than relying on imports.
Helleiner (1990:8) defines ISI as the reduction in the share of imports in the apparent
consumption of manufactured goods. The aim of ISI was to develop a country’s industrial
base behind a protective wall of tariff and non-tariff barriers, which would not only make
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it difficult for imports to permeate the protecting economy but also provide a captive
domestic market for local industry. Page (1990:110) further identifies directed allocation
of subsidised credit through the commercial and development banking system, and public
investment in industrial activities as other principal avenues of accelerated industrial
growth through ISI.
A third important reason for supporting ISI was couched in the infant industry and
externality argument, noted in Section 2.2.3. 
However, despite all its good intentions, ISI often became the chosen trade strategy not
because of economists’ rational arguments but rather because of expeditious ‘third best’ or
‘nth best’ policies undertaken to cope with balance of payments crises and because of social
and political forces acting on policy makers (Meier, 1990:156). By adopting a protectionist
stance, not only was a sheltered home market promoted and the welfare of political interest
groups catered for, but the trade taxes (revenue tariffs and export taxes) provided an
important source of revenue for the developing country (Rodrik, 1992a:312).
As Meier (1990:157) observes, critics of ISI point to the fact that it was not targeted
according to systematic criteria, but was instead pursued in a chaotic, inefficient manner
and for too long a time. This had the result, at the micro-level, of yielding too many plants
with insignificant output and low quality, not to mention the underutilisation of capital and
an increasingly oligopolistic or monopolistic industrial structure. ISI, as Meier (1990:157)
further notes, caused a sheltered firm’s profits in local currency terms to seem high,
notwithstanding the higher domestic resource cost, which increased with every unit of
foreign exchange saved. 
Added to the fact that effective rates of protection were exceedingly high, domestic value
added in some instances was actually negative at world prices. Valuable resources were also
expended on directly unproductive profit seeking and rent seeking activities. Rent seeking
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behaviour involved attempts by bureaucrats and businessmen to thwart or capture policy
initiatives not in their interest, which made protection a very costly exercise (Krueger,
1997:16). Further, businessmen and bureaucrats acquired an interest in maintaining the
system once established; with resources expended in maintaining the status quo, it was
recognised that changing the system would be politically difficult.
Fishlow (1984:194) sums up ISI as a second best policy, imposed to tax agriculture and
reallocate resources to industry, that was eventually brought down by the very
circumstances it was supposed to avert: a shortage of foreign exchange. This was especially
so, given the fact that countries failed to develop the export of manufactures at the same
time as exports of primary products  lagged (Meier, 1990:157). Krueger (1997:6) points out
that this resulted in the imposition of foreign exchange rationing, which together with
increased imports of capital and intermediate goods, led to a weakened balance of
payments situation. With accompanying budget deficits and inflationary pressures fuelled
by ambitious development plans, the end result was a large fiscal drain.
Meier (1990:157-8) concludes that with the end of the easy stage of ISI which involved the
replacement of non-durable consumer goods, production increasingly became high cost and
less economic. The incremental capital-labour ratio increased, the rate of growth in
aggregate output slowed down, and employment lagged as further ISI became more difficult.
ISI policies imposed dynamic losses on entire economies that far outweighed the loss of neo-
classical static allocative efficiency.
2.3.2 The Neo-Liberal Approach to Trade Policy
The 1970s and 1980s marked a resurgence of neo-classical economic thought under the
guise of neo-liberalism.  The more prominent writers associated with this strain of thinking
include Little et  al. (1971), Balassa  (1971), Ranis  (1981) and the World Bank (1993). The
emergence of neo-liberalism is generally agreed to have been brought about by the 1973 oil
crisis, worldwide recession and burgeoning foreign debt on the part of most developing
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countries. This scenario was further exacerbated by the widely acknowledged failure of
classic ISI to allocate resources efficiently, together with deteriorating employment and
income distribution. With the easy stage of ISI exhausted, the only option open to most
developing countries was to maintain domestic growth rates by either boosting domestic
demand or exports, the latter option being unfeasible owing to inefficient industries
(Schmitz, 1984:3).
Embracing traditional growth theory, the early neo-liberal theorists assumed growth to be
a natural process. According to Wright (1995:3), the resulting production function assumed
diminishing returns to factors of production (capital and labour) and constant returns to
scale. It was further assumed that an economy would converge to an equilibrium steady
state with capital and output growing at a similar rate as population and labour (with labour
augmenting technological growth). This model assumed both the rate of savings and growth
in labour force to be exogenously determined, with growth resulting from increased capital
employed per worker (Holden, 1993:216).
The heightened prominence of neo-liberal thought can also be understood in the context
of phenomenal growth rates realised by the East Asian nations of Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Singapore and South Korea, whose departure from ISI was marked by liberalised trade
programmes. According to Meier (1990:158), to achieve neutrality between production for
the domestic market and for export, it is important for the exchange rate for exports to
increase such that the ratio of the effective exchange rate for exports to that of importables
becomes close to unity. Meier (1990:158) further notes that this policy was extensively
carried out in East Asia, where competitive exchange rates were ensured by depreciation-if
domestic prices rose more rapidly than foreign prices-and by an attempt to limit wage
increases and inflation to increases in productivity.
In an attempt to explain the disparity in growth rates between East Asia and the rest of the
world, attention is drawn to the fact that these differences arose due to exchange rate
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management and the trade regime. This reinforced the proposition that outward oriented
policies, as reflected in real exchange rates that spurred exports, encouraged the
development of the tradeable sector. On the other hand, inward orientation and an
overvalued exchange rate fostered the growth of the non-tradeable sector in Latin America
and Africa (Dollar, 1992:523).
However, these earlier neo-liberal models failed to explain adequately the growth rates in
total output and output per capita that were observed in the post World War II era
(Holden, 1990:216; Lipsey et al., 1993:774). Implicit in these production functions was the
unexplained difference between potential and actual growth, which was resolved by
considering technology to be exogenously determined. Critics of traditional growth theory
also drew attention to the fact that if both population growth and technological growth
were exogenously determined, then so was overall growth. Hence it was not possible to
predict the growth rate or the variables affecting it ( Lipsey et  al., 1993:774). Also, because
technology was perfectly mobile between nations, and it played a pivotal role in explaining
growth, traditional growth theory predicted that all countries would ultimately converge
at a worldwide constant growth rate, an observation at variance with the real world, where
growth rates varied between countries.
Nonetheless, neo-liberal thinking, reinforced by their interpretation of the East Asian
miracle, was the backbone of World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programmes and
lending that developing countries were subjected to in the 1980s, as well as the cornerstone
of multilateral trading agreements such as the GATT.
According to Lall (1994b:645), the stance of the Bretton Woods institutions was ultimately
challenged by the Japanese delegation to the World Bank, as a result of which a report to
establish what really took place in East Asia was commissioned.  The resultant 1993 World
Bank publication titled “The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy”
(hereafter referred to as the Miracle Study) affirmed that economic growth was
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determined by growth in total factor productivity (TFP), arising from increased openness,
greater competition and higher investment in human resources.
In an admission that the state and market were inextricably intertwined, the Miracle Study
conceded that market failure was pervasive in developing countries, hence the need for
government intervention. Lall (1994b:647) describes the market failures in question as the
inability to co-ordinate investment within industry, due to missing information markets,
capital market deficiencies, economies of scale, interdependent investment in vertically
related activities, externalities in skill creation and learning and “multiple  linkages”. 
In order to ameliorate these market failures, Lall (1994a:65) adds, the World Bank
advocates functional “market friendly” interventions which do not favour one selected
activity over another. Functional interventions contrast sharply with selective
interventions, which take into account individual activities/groups in order to remedy
specific failures or externalities that would lead to sub-optimal resource allocation, either
in a static or dynamic sense.
In adopting TFP growth as their theoretical foundation, later neo-liberals adopted
endogenous growth theories, so called because technology was treated as an endogenous
variable. Endogenous growth models, as Singh (1994:1813) points out, assumed free mobility
of capital, labour and technology, together with free entry and exit of firms to be favourable
for the spread of knowledge and technological change. However, as he further notes, the
assumptions underlying the TFP approach, namely full employment and perfectly
competitive markets, together with a wholly supply side nature, ignored demand side
factors, which proved to be a fundamental flaw.
Nonetheless the main policy prescription by the later neo-liberals is to adopt a “market-
friendly” strategy, which dictates that countries seek their comparative advantage and as
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far as possible have free markets. This involves adoption of structural adjustment
programmes, an integral part of which is trade liberalisation.
Trade liberalisation has been variously defined by authors such as Michaely et al. (1991:13)
to mean “any act that would make the trade regime more ‘neutral’-nearer to a system free
of government intervention, and which frees the flow of trade between a country and its
(actual or potential) trade partners”. Advocates of trade liberalisation point to the static
and dynamic benefits to be gained from this process. One of the main static reasons for
advocating trade liberalisation is couched in arguments of allocative efficiency. Dornbusch
(1992:74) argues that by eliminating tariffs or quotas and their accompanying distortions,
it is cheaper to import goods which would otherwise be produced locally at greater cost.
Efficiency is thus gained by a reallocation of resources in keeping with the country’s
comparative advantage. 
A second reason for trade liberalisation is identified as technical efficiency, which arises
from the exposure of local firms to greater international competition. These firms are thus
forced to cut costs and modernise their  production techniques in order to compete with
foreign producers (Rodrik, 1990:155). As Dornbusch (1992:74) further points out, this is
especially the case for small countries, where restriction of imports results in a limited
variety of low quality manufactured goods, whose prices are well above those prevailing in
the world market.
Eradication of rent seeking and other associated directly unproductive behaviour is a third
reason for advocating trade liberalisation. Bliss (1989:1218) and Bell (1993:114) describe the
two as responsible for the wastage of valuable resources in pursuit of rents created by tariff
barriers and other forms of protection such as quotas. This results in rising costs of
protection and other forms of intervention. Examples of rent seeking and unproductive
behaviour include the building of factories or plants with excess capacity in order to gain
higher allocations of foreign exchange.
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As observed earlier, dynamic effects are seen in the growth of TFP, as well as the diffusion
of technology by multi-national corporations (MNCs). In an assessment of MNCs and
technology diffusion in South-East Asia, Harianto and Safarian (1997:197) argue that as
part of their investment packages, MNCs bring in a bundle of technologies embodied in
their financial, production, management and marketing capabilities. In addition, their likely
impact on the economy can be felt through the purchase of raw materials and intermediate
inputs locally, as well as technical linkages with domestic suppliers and buyers.
According to Harianto and Safarian (1997:197),  the same domestic buyers and sellers  gain
in the form of technical linkages including, inter alia, information linkages, technical
assistance, managerial and organisational assistance, financial assistance and procurement
assistance. Thus the more open the economy and the freer the entry of MNCs, the more
the benefits that could be reaped in terms of access to new technologies and skills, not to
mention the beneficial spillovers absorbed from the developmental activities of other firms
or industrial sectors (Harianto and Safarian, 1997:215).
2.3.3. The Neo-Structuralist (Revisionist) Approach to Trade Policy
Revisionism is associated with the writings of Amsden (1989) and Lall (1994a) among
others. The revisionist school of thought, in a radical departure from mainstream
structuralism, acknowledges the failure of classic ISI, characterised by irrational and
inefficient forms of intervention (Lall, 1994a:65). It  not only questions the neo-liberal
interpretation of what really happened in East Asia, but also the accompanying policy
prescriptions  drawn from the neo-classical perspective, which are at variance with the real
world.
Revisionists draw on new trade theories, particularly the technology models of trade which
focus on how technology and growth affect trade patterns, and argue that trade policy
should be designed with explicit consideration of technological change. Central to the
revisionist standpoint is the notion of technological learning. According to Lall (1996:117),
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technology is characterised by “tacit” elements, thus it is not possible for it to be transferred
like a physical product. In order for it to be mastered, there has to be investment in new
skills, technical information, organisational methods and external linkages. Lall (1996:117)
further adds that mastering technology may be relatively short, easy and predictable in the
case of easy technologies, and prolonged, risky and unpredictable where they are complex
and require many stages of production and large numbers of interacting firms in the
production chain. 
Once the neo-classical assumptions of perfect information in technology markets and full
transferability of technology are relaxed, market failure results. As Lall (1996:117) notes,
with the costs, risks and information gaps in the learning process, firms have a tendency to
under invest in such technology. This undermines the process of technological deepening,
entry into complex technologies, increasing local content and the performance of more
demanding technological tasks like research and development activity.
The capabilities approach embraced by revisionists to propound a case for state activism
dismisses the notion that selection, absorption and mastery of technology are costless and
passive. Hence it sees the need for the development of new knowledge, skills and
organisational forms, and linkages between enterprises in the acquisition  of technological
capabilities, a process which in itself is faced with a host of market failures arising from
learning cost considerations.
With regard to policy implications, revisionists put forward a strong case for industrial policy
(defined as all those activities undertaken to promote industrial development beyond that
permitted by free market forces), and by extension the state, in encouraging the learning
and investment that are prerequisite for industrial development. This is premised on the
notion that rapid industrialisation is only possible through intervention. According to Lall
(1994b:646), the nature of intervention advocated is of a selective as opposed to functional
nature, aimed at counteracting market failure in the promotion of technological deepening
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and entry into complex technologies. Through selective intervention, it is possible for
governments to design these interventions if they have the right objectives, skills and
information, and if these interventions are set in a framework of export orientation.  
Interventions are necessary if market failure in resource allocation within and between
firms is to be alleviated. These interventions may cover particular sets of activities and
require the promotion of large firms. Lall (1994b:649) also argues the case for interventions
to be integrated with selective interventions in factor markets, including measures affecting
the mode of technology import. Further, these incentives have to be offset by measures that
motivate investment in capability development. 
A host of case studies on various countries provide support for this perspective. In the case
of South Korea, these studies highlight remarkable parallels in the form of state action by
the government of the time, and the prescriptions revisionists advocate as being
prerequisite for development (Streak, 1997:317).
Despite advocating state activism in industrial development, revisionists remain acutely
aware of the real possibility of interventions failing (government failure), but argue that
state intervention will not always produce this result.
2.4 Which Way for Trade Policy?
The current debate on trade liberalisation pits the World Bank “market friendly” approach
against the revisionist heterodox approach, with the main point of contention being the
efficacy of industrial policy in promoting industrialisation. Considerable controversy also
arises from the different interpretations of the East Asian success stories by these different
paradigms, and whether any inferences can be drawn for other developing countries.
According to Singh (1994:1821), both the market friendly and revisionist standpoints
acknowledge the role government intervention played in rapid economic growth and
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industrialisation. However, differences still emerge insofar as the role of industrial policy is
concerned. World Bank economists advocate wholesale liberalisation, deregulation and the
opening up of economies to facilitate the free flow of capital, goods and technology, but due
to acceptance of endogenous growth theory, argue for functional interventions to develop
skills and avert market failures. On the other hand, revisionists argue that state action (in
the form of import protection as export promotion, involving the use of strategic trade
policy) in the period when South Korea and other newly industrialising countries began to
take off, is consistent with what they advocate as being prerequisite for rapid development
(Lall, 1994b:650).
Examples of state action include, inter alia, the identification and nurturing of selected
industries where comparative advantage was sought, together with managed control of
technology transfer, entry into the industry, capacity expansion and the attainment of
export targets. Streak (1997:318) further points to the creation of large conglomerates (the
chaebol), promotion of mergers between firms, dictation of entry/exit of firms from the
industry in accordance with the requirements of scale economies, and conditions of world
demand as being instrumental in South Korea’s growth. The existence of tight controls on
foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign majority ownership and the licensing of technology
also played a prominent role.
However, most of the instruments of industrial policy are increasingly constrained by the
dominant neo-liberal led conditionality policies of the International Monetary Fund/World
Bank and multilateral organisations like the World Trade Organization (WTO), which
uphold the primacy of liberalisation and the supremacy of the market. Streak (1997:319)
argues that this has undermined the ability of developing country governments to engage
in the same institutional innovation and policies that are prerequisite for rapid
industrialisation. Singh (1994:1821) also criticises the World Bank stance, and argues that
it should concern itself more with the institutional imitation and innovation that would be
necessary to launch developing countries onto a higher growth path.  Without this, Streak
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(1997:323) sums up, rapid growth will be solely dependent on an ability to attract FDI, the
extent of the negative impact of liberalisation on the balance of payments, the
responsiveness of exports to devaluation and other economic windfalls.
The limitations associated with wholesale trade liberalisation cast doubts on whether it is
appropriate for developing countries. This is especially in light of the fact that trade
liberalisation episodes in developing countries take place against a background of serious
macroeconomic instability, which sometimes serves to negate the net effects of the
liberalisation itself.
Bell (1993:114-115) enumerates some of the ill effects of import liberalisation, a key
component of trade liberalisation. Noting that the immediate impact of tariff reduction is
an increase in the value of imports, he further adds that any stimulatory effect on exports
is likely to be delayed and possibly weak. This further weakens the country’s trade balance
and aggravates macroeconomic instability. Besides tariff reduction impeding fiscal balance
(due to taxes comprising a large share of government revenues), import liberalisation is
likely to have adverse effects on import competing industries, by reducing their market
power and ability to dictate prices by withholding sales. The impact is mostly felt in
traditional labour intensive industries such as clothing and textiles (Rodrik, 1992b:101).
Another issue of contention lies in the credibility of governments in implementing trade
policy reforms. As Rodrik (1992b:101) and Bell (1993:115) note, if the private sector
responds with scepticism to trade reform packages, it may be disinclined to allocate
resources efficiently, and thus the potential efficiency gains do not materialise. The lack
of credibility hence renders the process of trade reform harmful.
Rodrik (1992b:101) further casts doubts on the notion that technical efficiency through
cost cutting, rationalisation of production and the identification of new markets is
sustainable on theoretical or empirical grounds. Bell (1993:116) adds that this is because
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the idea of entrepreneurial slack, which is the basis of most models, and which argues that
entrepreneurs will be spurred into additional effort in the wake of liberalisation, does not
necessarily hold. This is especially true of countries which have, in the wake of prolonged
recession, practised so much cost cutting that no more slack exists.
Wright (1995:15) and Rodrik (1992b:103) observe that undue emphasis should not be
placed on trade policy reform as a panacea for all economic problems because it only
provides an enabling environment for development, without necessarily guaranteeing long
term growth. Wright (1995:15) further adds that attention should be focused on specific
policies aimed at directly influencing innovation, diffusion and the enhancement of
technological capabilities, with the ultimate aim of encouraging structural change and the
shifting of comparative advantage into more technologically dynamic sectors (and ensuring
sustained growth). Some of these policies would encourage research and development,
technology transfer and foreign direct investment, aimed at enhancing domestic
capabilities and skills, and greater support for industrial training objectives.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter set out to examine the various trade theories and how they have influenced
thinking on trade policy orientation. It argued that orthodox neo-liberal thinking, which
currently dominates economic thought, provides policy prescriptions which are flawed and
lacking in robustness, thus making them largely inapplicable in a developing country
context. It was also argued that industrial policy and state activism still have an important
role to play in technological deepening and ensuring sustained growth.
It is in this context, therefore, that the following chapter critically analyses the evolution
of trade policy in South Africa, and whether sustained growth is likely to be forthcoming,
given the neo-liberal stance that policy makers have in recent years adopted.
4Totals may not be 100 because of rounding.
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CHAPTER 3
THE EVOLUTION OF TRADE POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA
3.1 Introduction
This chapter will investigate the evolution of trade policy in South Africa against the
backdrop of the discussion in Chapter 2 and the country’s efforts to liberalise its trade
regime from the early 1970s to the present day. The aim of the chapter is to provide an
understanding of attempts to liberalise the motor vehicle sector, and the implications
arising therefrom.
3.2 Background
South Africa currently boasts an economy which is not unlike that of other middle-income
developing countries. The country’s manufacturing sector was by 1995 a significant
contributor to overall gross domestic product (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Distribution of gross domestic product4 by sector 1995 (per cent)
Country/Sector Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services
Brazil 14 13 24 49
Mexico 8 7 19 67
Namibia 14 20 9 56
South Africa 5 7 24 64
Zimbabwe 14 20 9 56
Notes:
(1) Industry comprises mining, construction, electricity, water and gas.
(2) Manufacturing is considered separately owing to its dynamic nature.
(3) Services incorporate unallocated items.
Source: World Bank (1997:236-237).
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The manufacturing sector in turn is broadly based, and comprises heavy capital-intensive
activity based on mining and energy, including iron and steel, heavy chemical industries and
beneficiation of other non-ferrous metals. There also is significant production of food and
beverages, electrical machinery, transport equipment, motor vehicles and components
Not unlike many other middle-income developing countries, South Africa has alternately
travelled the paths of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) and export-oriented
industrialisation (EOI), as documented in various studies. Notable among these are Holden
(1990), Bell (1993), Belli et  al. (1993), Strydom (1995) and Jenkins and Siwisa (1997), which
all identify chronologically the stages the country’s industrialisation has undergone.  From
1925 onwards, South Africa elected to adopt ISI, not only as a vehicle for industrialisation,
but also to reduce its reliance on exports of agricultural produce and gold, together with
dependence on Great Britain. All this was undertaken, as McCarthy (1998:67) and Hirsch
(1997:1) note, with the ultimate aim of boosting employment (and, in the process,
alleviating the poor white problem, to champion the interests of the Afrikaner elite). 
However, with the easy stage of ISI exhausted, South Africa opted not to switch to EOI but
rather to deepen ISI in capital intensive upstream heavy industrial and chemical ventures
such as SASOL, Atlantis Diesel Engines (ADE) and MOSSGAS. This was done behind a
wall of tariffs which, while moderate in comparison to other countries, was further
complicated by a complex system of customs duties and import surcharges, with exemptions
being granted on a firm-by-firm basis. Belli et al. (1993:3) observe that these implied
importer-specific rather than product-specific tariffs.
According to Belli et al. (1993:1), a World Bank study into the trade regimes of 32
developing countries corroborates this, placing South Africa just above the median out of
the sample of countries studied, the distinguishing features of the country’s protective
regime being complexity and  a high level of dispersion. With 35 ad valorem tariff rates, 2 685
items with specific/formula/other types of rates and four levels of import surcharge rates,
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South Africa, they note, displayed an exceptionally high ranking with regard to the
coefficient of dispersion of tariff rates. This scenario was further compounded by the fact
that the manufacturing sector was often able to lobby the Board of Trade and Industry
(BTI), which traditionally adopted a sympathetic stance to such applications (Roberts,
1998:21). 
Hence there was increased protection from international competitors. In return for
protection, these industries were expected to supply at least 60 per cent of the domestic
market, while criteria such as contribution to employment creation, economic growth and
technological development were also taken into account. This was in an attempt to identify
areas of potential comparative advantage (McCarthy, 1998:69).
As Belli et al. (1993:3)  observe, in the decades after 1925, ISI under “moderate and
selective” protection was the driving force behind the country’s industrialisation, together
with a wide ranging system of quantitative restrictions (QRs). The explanation for this
inward-looking approach to industrialisation is couched in the strategic industry argument.
McCarthy (1998:70) argues that this involved the South African government of the time
selecting industries for fast-track development through the provision of special assistance,
and the establishment of a domestic motor industry. From the 1970s, when South Africa’s
status as a pariah state became more pronounced, the high and sustained growth realised
in the immediate post-World War II era began to slacken, accompanied by the weakening
and stagnation of the domestic economy (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Average Annual Growth Rates in Real GDP (per cent)
1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-92 1992-97
GDP 5.94 5.15 3.49 3.13 1.36 1.03 2.60
Note: GDP at factor cost measured in constant 1990 Rands.
Source: Quarterly Bulletin of the Reserve Bank of South Africa, various issues.
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It is also worth noting that with most of the country’s exports in semi-processed form, there
had been very little improvement in their competitive edge. This, together with the
emergence of a highly capital intensive and inefficient manufacturing sector prompted the
government to analyse its strategy critically,  and thus the first liberalisation episode was
born.
3.3 The First Liberalisation Episode (1972-1977)
The first liberalisation episode was heralded by the 1972 report of the Reynders Commission
of Inquiry into South Africa’s Export Trade. Mandated with the task of the identification
and removal of obstacles hindering free trade, and suggesting ways of bolstering South
Africa’s export competitiveness, the Reynders Report recommended the following:
(i) the introduction of an “export development assistance scheme” to spur exports,
involving a tax allowance for marketing expenses (Belli et al., 1992:3; Jenkins and
Siwisa, 1997:7);
(ii) the replacement of QRs with tariffs lower than those implicit in the QRs, together
with a real devaluation of the Rand.
The Reynders Report further recommended the promotion of exports in the manufacturing
sector as a long term solution to meeting future foreign exchange needs, and suggested the
introduction of export incentives to countervail the effects of distance from markets and
the influx of subsidised exports from other countries (Jenkins and Siwisa, 1997:6). These
included direct cash grants, tax concessions on export turnover and export profits, rail
freight concessions, tax concessions on the use of tariff laden inputs, and rebates on import
duties paid on imported inputs. The Report also laid emphasis on the need to reduce
reliance on gold as a source of foreign exchange, and more specifically to diversify into the
export of non-gold items.
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Bell (1993:85) notes that this first liberalisation episode was relatively mild, its effects being
largely eroded by a substantial real appreciation of the Rand owing to a gold-led export
boom, which culminated in the reduced competitiveness of South Africa’s manufactures,
and increased calls for protection. Jenkins and Siwisa (1997:8) observe further that this,
together with the prevailing world recession in the early 1980s, lent credence to the notion
that exchange rate management and the level of demand were more important
determinants of export levels than the export incentives offered in the early 1970s. This
conclusion contrasts with a study by Holden and Gouws (1997), which found that not all
manufacturing exports were influenced by the exchange rate, since some industrial sectors
enjoyed greater productivity as the proportion of output exported grew (Holden and Gouws,
1997:28).
3.4 The Second Liberalisation Episode (1983-1990)
Bell (1993:87) identifies 1983 as the beginning of a more intensified period of trade
liberalisation. This period was characterised by a decline in the pace of economic expansion,
which can be ascribed to the collapse of the gold price, a sharp decline of exports in general,
burgeoning foreign debt and heightened political instability (Bell, 1993:93). In the period
between the onset of the second episode and the end of the preceding one, however,
notable developments included the constitution of the van Huyssteen Committee, which
was charged with the task of revising the country’s system of export incentives.
This culminated in the introduction of a more powerful system of export incentives
designed to ease the pressure on exporters of the comparatively higher cost of local
production and delivery to overseas markets. Customs duty drawbacks and duty
exemptions were granted to exporters. Bell (1993:87) dismisses this system as unwieldy as
it was not used to acquire free access to more competitive inputs. The incentive system was
further negated by the massive real appreciation of the Rand, accompanied by a worldwide
recession, which, as discussed in the previous section, led to the beginning of a sharp
decline in South Africa’s exports.
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In the second episode of liberalisation, the abolition of the dual exchange rate  in 1983
(which was to be reimposed two years later) was accompanied by the implementation of
export subsidies to reduce the anti-export bias inherent in the economy. The latter flowed
from the findings of the Committee on Industrial Development Strategy (the 1983 Kleu
Report), which also advocated moderate protection and periodic tariff reviews in an
attempt to temper the cost-raising effect of tariff protection (McCarthy, 1998:70). The
reduction in QRs and their replacement with tariffs lower than those implicit in the QRs
would be construed as an aspect of trade liberalisation.
Jenkins and Siwisa (1997:10) further note that the Kleu Report was critical of existing
export incentives, which neither favoured domestic intervention nor created incentives for
technical innovation, querying the merits of uniform versus selective export assistance, as
uniform assistance would benefit even those exporters who needed it least.
The process of trade liberalisation was further enhanced in 1985, when the government
changed the publication of a positive list (which specified items needing no approval for
importation) to a negative list of items which needed approval prior to importation. Bell
(1993:87) identifies this action as a major step in the process of trade liberalisation. In the
same year, however, there arose a debt crisis, which can be attributed to a dramatic
reduction in foreign direct investment and capital inflows, culminating in a large and
sustained balance of payments deficit.
This resulted in some policy reversals, with the reimposition of the dual exchange rate
system coupled with a significant real depreciation of the Rand and the introduction of a
10 per cent import surcharge. The latter contributed to an increase in the weighted average
of the effective protection rate (EPR) from 30 per cent to 70 per cent (in 1987 estimates).
EPRs ranged from a low of 1.0 per cent (for non-electrical machinery) to a high of 348 per
cent for synthetic resins, as compared to a range of 1.0 per cent to 143 per cent for the same
commodities in the preceding period (Jenkins and Siwisa, 1997:13-14).
5Earlier phases of the local content programme will be considered in Section 4.2 on the
history of the automotive industry in South Africa.
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Towards the end of the 1980s, South Africa’s commitment to trade liberalisation became
more evident, especially with the Board on Tariffs and Trade (BTT), which had succeeded
the BTI, hardening its stance towards private sector requests for protection. In 1989 only
20 per cent of such requests were supported,  as opposed to 38 per cent in 1988 and 65 per
cent in the previous year (Jenkins and Siwisa, 1997:11). Export promotion was further
enhanced by the introduction in 1989 of sectoral “structural adjustment programmes”.
These sectoral programmes had been at the heart of the BTI’s 1988 policy document “A
Policy and Strategy for the Development of Structural Adjustment of Industry”. 
According to Black (1993:210), these programmes were aimed at enhancing the
competitiveness of local industry via selection and targeting, on the grounds that
comparative advantage was not a static concept and could be created by governments.
Emphasis was also laid on the role of the state regarding technology transfer policy, with
foreign exchange applications being evaluated on criteria such as the amount of royalty
payments, restrictive clauses (on exports) and the existence of alternative  local sources of
technology. As Black (1993:212) notes, these programmes generated considerable conflict
between the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the BTI, with the former
criticising the complicated and unmanageable programmes, which were clearly unaffordable
on the grounds of insufficient staff for their implementation and openness to fraud on the
part of exporters.
According to Black (1994:53), the motor industry’s structural adjustment programme,
commonly dubbed Phase VI5 of the local content programme, was designed to meet the
following objectives: 
(i) promotion of investment, job creation and growth;
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(ii) satisfaction of the country’s essential transport requirements;
(iii) improvement of productivity;
(iv) minimising price increases;
(v) maintaining a high level of competition.
Going further to describe Phase VI as the first attempt to address the issue of an overly
fragmented industry characterised by low volumes of output and high associated unit costs,
Black (1994:53) notes that local content was to be measured by value (ex works price less
foreign exchange used). This was in stark contrast to the existing system which measured
local content in terms of weight, with emphasis on the use of locally produced components.
Phase VI entailed the imposition of a 37.5 per cent excise duty on all locally assembled
vehicles, subject to a 50 per cent rebate on local content value (implying that, in effect, no
duty was payable if a target of 75 per cent local content was achieved).
Introduced with the aim of encouraging local content and specialisation, Phase VI was
nonetheless beset with problems arising from its rapid introduction, which gave little
consideration to its likely impact. Duncan (1997:79) notes that inaccurate predictions on
exports led to rapid changes in the Phase VI programme soon after it was introduced.
Excise duties were rapidly increased when the government realised  that revenue collection
dwindled as a result of manufacturers being more successful than expected.
According to Duncan (1997:79), Phase VI succeeded in orienting assemblers from heavy
local components and high value imports to higher value local sourcing coupled with
increased export levels. Not only was the goal of saving foreign exchange attained, but the
South African motor industry was also more closely integrated into international motor
vehicle production.
However, despite the fact that it is credited with a rapid boost in export growth in both
components and fully built up units (FBUs), the major shortcomings of Phase VI stem from
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its protective nature and the fact that it encouraged model proliferation. Another major
point of contention lay with component manufacturers, who felt deprived of business, owing
to the fact that Phase VI allowed car manufacturers to obtain cheaper components from
overseas with the foreign exchange credits obtained from exports, and in the process denied
them import protection (van Zyl and Kotze, 1994:33). Component manufacturers were also
put under severe pressure to restructure, following the introduction of new models under
Phase VI.
Car manufacturers also viewed Phase VI as constraining them to licensing agreements with
their overseas principals (in respect of the export of FBUs) as opposed to encouraging both
manufacturers and component suppliers to concentrate on cost-effective exports, which
were the main thrust of the outward-looking focus of Phase VI (Finance Week, Aug 13-19,
1992). As a result of this, the programme has undergone many changes, considered in the
subsequent section.
3.5 Trade Liberalisation after 1990
The beginning of the 1990s was marked by the introduction of the General Export Incentive
Scheme (GEIS). This was mainly designed to help exporters offset the price disadvantage
they faced in international markets, and was implemented through a selective system of
liberal tax-free grants. According to McCarthy (1998:70), these grants increased through
four phases of higher value added and domestic content, with industries characterised by
both high value added and high local content qualifying for a nominal subsidy of 19.5 per
cent of export turnover, whilst those firms with low value added and low domestic turnover
qualified for only 2 per cent. Hatty (1993:132) further adds that the GEIS also took into
account  fluctuations in the Rand value compared with a basket of major international
currencies. Imported materials benefiting from the duty drawback system were, however,
ineligible for any compensation under the GEIS scheme.
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The introduction of the GEIS was closely followed in June 1990 by the publication of a study
by the IDC entitled “The Modification of the Application of Protection Policy” (IDC, 1990).
This report was a major turning point as far as liberalisation was concerned, arguing that the
scope for further ISI was limited, necessitating a shift to EOI (Black, 1992:213). In contrast
to the BTT’s structural adjustment programmes, the IDC report advocated a much more
uniform and lower tariff structure, arguing that the prevailing system was defective owing
to the cost-raising implications of a relatively high protective structure, as well as the
resource misallocation arising from sectoral variations in protection levels (Black, 1992:213-
214). The IDC report identified, inter  alia, the absence of regular tariff reviews, limited
further opportunities for ISI, lack of highly skilled personnel to administer selectivity in an
effective manner, and the excessive use of cost-raising formula duties as all warranting a
process of structural adjustment towards EOI.
Black (1992:214) categorises some of the recommendations of the IDC report  as follows:
(i) Lowering of protection: The lowering of protection was to be achieved by the
replacement of formula duties with more specific anti-dumping measures,
supplemented by the gradual downward adjustment of tariffs to pre-determined
levels within a 4-5 year time frame. The only exceptions to this would be with regard
to industries which would still qualify for protection at similar levels to those
prevailing in more established industries.
(ii) Measures to encourage export expansion: The supply side measures proposed by
the IDC to achieve export expansion included, inter alia, lower corporation tax,
encouragement of higher domestic savings, realistic exchange rate policy and an
improvement in the supply of skilled labour.
Criticism has been levelled against the IDC report on account of its fundamental
weaknesses. These stem from a heavy over-reliance on the World Bank neo-classical
6Cited in Black (1993:220).
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orthodox approach to free trade, gleaned from the success stories of the East Asian
countries, but widely considered inapplicable to developing countries. Black (1993: 217-223)
identifies the following shortcomings: 
(i) the report was more concerned with trade rather than industrial policy, and failed
to give more attention to complementary supply side measures crucial to export
success, such as the attraction of investment and technology into specified sectors,
which was vital for accelerated productivity growth and technical change;
(ii) central to the report was the notion of static comparative advantage, while the
concept of dynamic comparative advantage and how it would change over time was
ignored;
(iii) whereas the IDC report advocated outward orientation on the grounds that there
existed little scope for further import substitution, this stance may be criticised as
import substitution remains an integral part of all successful industrialisation
experiences and, he argues, is a necessary prelude to breaking into export markets;
(iv) the assumption that reduced protection would result in export expansion by the
reduction of import prices and exposure to international competition, a notion
which, he argues, enjoys little  empirical support; according to Helleiner (1990)6,
although there may be gains from improved allocative efficiency, these could easily
be offset by the costs of adjustment;
(v) the adoption of uniform levels of protection on the grounds of easier
implementation, an argument which lacked merit given ever-present lobbying for
7 Cited in Black (1993:216).
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protection by special cases, and the complex anti-dumping measures which would
require skilled expertise to administer;
(vi) the costs of transition, such as the failure of small firms to reap the benefits of
liberalisation and entry into export markets, and the  loss of employment occasioned
by the exit of firms  from the industry.
The South African Chamber of Business (SACOB), while offering lukewarm support for
“the approach towards greater export orientation, if by export orientation was meant the
creation of an outward looking strategy”, advocated a more cautious approach, supporting
industrial targeting and the retention of selectivity (SACOB, 1991:8).7
With specific reference to the motor vehicle industry, September 1995 witnessed the
unveiling of the Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP), a radical departure from
the local content programmes exemplified by the Phase VI it replaced. The MIDP was
largely a result of the investigations of the Motor Industry Task Group established in 1992.
The IDC Report on Measures and Policies Impacting on South African Industry (IDC,
1997c:3) describes the main features of the MIDP as being:
(i) the reduction of tariff protection on imports of FBUs from an effective 115 per cent
in 1994 to 65 per cent in July 1995, 61 per cent in January 1996, and ultimately 40 per
cent by the year 2002; similarly, duty on completely knocked down (CKD) kits
would fall to 49 per cent over the same time span, with the ultimate objective of
enhancing international competitiveness;
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(ii) the reduction of  the number of locally produced models from the existing 39 to 15
over an 8 year period, with duty-free incentives to enhance high volume selling
models at the expense of low volume ones;
(iii) the granting of a duty free allowance of 27 per cent of wholesale vehicle sales
turnover to vehicle manufacturers producing on a CKD basis;
(iv) allowing a manufacturer of motor vehicles to import R1 of vehicles or components
duty-free for every R1 of local content exported in the form of vehicles; similarly, for
every R1 worth of components exported, the exporter would be allowed to import
R0.75 worth of motor vehicles and R1 of components duty free;
(v) a small vehicle incentive (SVI), which involved a duty-free allowance granted in
respect of motor vehicles below a nett ex factory selling price of R40 000, calculated
on the basis of ([R40 000-ex factory selling price] x 0.003 x ex factory selling price);
(vi) an excise duty on FBUs, which in effect penalised the import of expensive vehicles.
The IDC report (1997c:5) observes further that for every R1 of local content FBU exports,
the import costs for vehicles after tariffs per R1 of imports free on board (FOB) of local
manufacturers in 1996 would be reduced by R0.61. This implies an export incentive (or
looking at it differently, an import advantage) of 61 per cent for FBUs. In the same vein,
there would be a 35 per cent export incentive applicable in 1996 to components used to
offset vehicle imports. The report further adds that, by the year 2002, the incentive to
export FBUs and components would have fallen, in accordance with the lowering of tariffs,
to 40 per cent and 23 per cent respectively, as compared to an export incentive of 50 per
cent of local content under the defunct Phase VI programme.
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Other objectives of the MIDP included the facilitation of locally manufactured vehicles
and components (MITG, 1994:1). This was done with the aim of enhancing economies of
scale and promoting effective capacity utilisation. The MIDP was also envisaged to develop
human resources and productivity, with the ultimate aim of ensuring stable employment
in the longer term (MITG, 1994:1).
Whereas the reduction in models built within the country will limit the range of exportable
components, it must be noted that the uneconomic proliferation of models has resulted in
diseconomies of scale. With larger volumes of fewer models, it follows that interested
parties such as the National Association of Automotive Components and Allied
Manufacturers (NAACAM), the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers of
South Africa (NAAMSA) and motorists will be the ultimate beneficiaries.
The financial sector has also witnessed liberalisation. Particularly noteworthy has been the
abolition, in 1995, of the financial Rand and the relaxation of exchange controls for both
residents and non-residents a year later.  A favourable exchange rate has also been
enhanced by a large depreciation of the weighted exchange rate since early 1996,
accompanied by an acceleration in tariff reduction. The rationale behind this is an attempt
to offset the inflationary effects of exchange rate depreciation on consumers and import
dependent manufacturers, as well as to sustain the boost in exports occasioned by a fall in
the value of the Rand (IDC, 1997b:1-2).
3.6 South Africa and the Uruguay Round
South Africa was one of the 123 countries which ratified the Final Act of the Uruguay
Round (UR) of trade negotiations in April 1994. This marked the full reacceptance of
South Africa into the world community after years of isolation. Although South Africa
joined the UR negotiations after the watershed political events of February 1990, the
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country had in fact been a founder member of the original GATT in 1947, where it was
bestowed developed country status which prevails to the present day.
The origins of the GATT can be traced to the period immediately after the end of World
War II and the Bretton Woods Conference, which established the International Monetary
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank).
The objectives behind the formation of the GATT were threefold. First among these was
the provision of a framework to oversee the conduct of trade relations between countries.
The second main objective was the provision of a framework for and the promotion of the
abolition of trade barriers between countries. The establishment of a code of conduct
barring member countries from taking unilateral action on trade matters was the third goal
of the GATT.
Negotiations under GATT auspices take the form of multilateral rounds of talks. The latest
of these, the Uruguay Round (UR), commenced in Punta Del Este, in September 1986, and
was to drag on for a record eight years before the final accord was ratified in Marrakesh,
Morocco, in April 1994. This marked the end of protracted trade negotiations, which, given
the frustrating lack of progress, at times threatened the entire round with derailment.
The 1994 GATT Treaty succeeded in reinforcing the above principles. This is largely due
to the fact that all participating countries had to accede to all the Agreements passed at
the conference, unlike in the case of previous rounds  when this was done on a selective
basis. Significant  highlights of the UR were the ratification of the Agreement on Trade
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Agreement on Trade Related Investment
Measures (TRIMs) and the formation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The UR
also succeeded in strengthening improved market access through the gradual reduction
and, ultimately, abolition of a large majority of trade barriers. This latter scenario is bound
to have profound effects on manufacturing industry in South Africa, and the automotive
sector in particular. 
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The IDC Report (1997c:1) outlines South Africa’s UR offer as including, inter alia:
(i) the imposition of ad valorem tariffs on all agricultural and industrial products,
replacing previous QRs and formula duties;
(ii) the rationalisation of the 12 000 odd tariff lines into between 5 000 and 
6 000 tariff lines, to be completed within the 5 year adjustment period;
(iii) increasing tariff bindings from 55 per cent to 98 per cent of all tariff lines, effectively
ensuring that tariffs could not be raised without WTO authority; any permission so
given would exact a price in the form of equivalent tariff liberalisations;
(iv) standardisation of all tariff lines from the existing 80 levels ranging from 0-100 per
cent to 6 levels of 0 per cent, 5 per cent, 10 per cent, 15 per cent, 20 per cent and
30 per cent;
(v) tariffs on raw materials ranging from 0-10 per cent, those on intermediate products
and components from 10-15 per cent, and consumer goods from 20-30 per cent;
(vi) the granting of duty free status to tariff sub-headings covering products not
manufactured within the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), except when
protecting an industry within SACU producing a suitable substitute; in this case the
relevant rate of duty would be justified for the sake of simplifying the administration
of the Customs Union;
(vii) compliance with the new WTO framework within the 5 year grace period
mandatory for all developed countries, for the majority of all South African
industries.
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One exception to this rule was the clothing and textiles sector, granted a 12 year grace
period to attain a maximum tariff of 45 per cent as opposed to the prescribed 30 per cent.
Likewise, the motor vehicle sector was granted an eight year period to attain a maximum
tariff of 50 per cent.
South Africa’s offer to the UR for the automotive industry is shown in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3: South Africa’s offer to the WTO of Tariff Reduction in the
Automotive Industry
HARMONISED
SYSTEM 
(HS) CODE
DESCRIPTION NEW TARIFF
OFFER 
(per cent)
CUSTOMS DUTY
AS AT 1994 (per
cent)
87012 000 Road tractors for semi-trailers 50 100
8702 Motor vehicles for the transport of ten or more
persons 
50 100
8703 Motor cars and other motor cars designed for the
transport of persons (excluding those under heading
8702)
50 100
8704 Motor vehicles for the transport of goods 50 100
8706 Chassis fitted with engines, for the motor vehicles of
headings 8701 to 8705
50 100
8707 Bodies (including cabs) for the motor vehicles of
headings 8701 to 8705
30 50
8708 Parts and accessories for the motor vehicles under
headings 8701 to 8705
30 50
Source: van Zyl et al.(1994:3).
It is instructive to note that although South Africa’s offer to the UR for the automotive
industry was only 50 per cent, the country has in fact been scaling down tariffs at a faster
rate, with the 1998 figure being 54.5 per cent. It is ultimately envisaged that the country’s
tariff rate for this particular sector will stand at 40 per cent, which is in line with the Motor
Industry Development Programme’s plan. This has caused much concern to the key players
in the motor industry, investigated further in subsequent chapters.
The timetable for duty reductions under the MIDP is shown in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4 : Duty Reduction Timetable under the MIDP
Year Import Duty for FBUs 
(per cent)
Import Duty for Components (per
cent)
1 September 1995 65.0 49.0
I January 1996 61.0 46.0
1 January 1997 57.5 43.0
1 January 1998 54.0 40.0
1 January 1999 50.5 37.5
1 January 2000 47.0 35.0
1 January 2001 43.5 32.5
1 January 2002 40.0 30.0
Source: NAAMSA (1998b).
The country reserves the right to exercise import controls in special circumstances, to
provide temporary infant industry protection or to use countervailing duties in the case of
dumping by non-WTO members (Jenkins and Siwisa, 1997:16). For the automotive
industry, a major consequence of the accession to the TRIMs Agreement has been the
abolition of the use of local content requirements, which were especially pervasive in motor
vehicle manufacturing in South Africa until 1995.
When the MIDP was launched in 1995, it was stipulated that it would be subject to a Mid-
Term Review after 3 years, in order to evaluate its progress and whether it had succeeded
in meeting its objectives. This review was carried out in late 1998, and amendments to the
programme were proposed, largely because some industry players, especially the component
manufacturers, felt that the rapid reduction of tariffs put them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis
imports. It was also felt that the SVI had not achieved its objective of making vehicles more
affordable to the general population, but had instead encouraged model proliferation and
sparked off a price war among manufacturers, especially for entry-level vehicles. 
8Although the proposed changes to the MIDP were gazetted in March 1999, they have yet to
be formally promulgated into law. This will take place at the end of 1999.
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Further, despite the MIDP’s aim of reducing the automotive industry’s adverse trade
balance, the deficit at the end of 1997 was still sizeable and the industry remained a net
user of foreign exchange. It is noteworthy that in the period between its inception and the
Mid-Term Review, a number of component manufacturers were forced out of business.
Another unintended consequence was the emergence of intense lobbying by both
NAAMSA and NAACAM, in an attempt to force amendments favourable to their
members.
The Mid-Term Review proposed that the scaling down of tariffs continue until 2007, albeit
at a slower rate, until a maximum of 30 per cent and 25 per cent was achieved for motor
vehicles and components8 (Table 3.5).
Table 3.5: Proposed tariff reduction for the automotive industry (2002-2007)
Year Tariff on FBUs (per cent) Tariff on Components (per cent)
2002 40 30
2003 38 29
2004 36 28
2005 34 27
2006 32 26
2007 30 25
Source: Board on Tariffs and Trade (1999).
Other proposed amendments to the MIDP included, inter alia, that:
(i) the duty free allowance of 27 per cent be maintained until 2002, after which only
those model lines which achieved a certain volume would remain eligible for the
allowance until 2007;
9For detailed information on the proposed changes to the MIDP, see Board on Tariffs and
Trade (1999).
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(ii) the SVI be phased out by 2003, with the R40 000 cut-off point increasing annually
by a percentage equivalent to the producer price index for the previous year, until
its eventual abolition;
(iii) import rebate credits continue beyond 2002, but on a phasing down basis, with
tooling exports retaining their eligibility as MIDP exports in order to ensure the
continued viability of component exports.9
The changes to the MIDP, while reflecting a slowdown in the reduction of nominal tariffs
and the gradual abolition of incentives such as the SVI nonetheless indicate a strong
commitment to the UR agreement by the government, which is determined to allow
market forces eventually to dictate developments in the automotive industry. 
Considering the pre- and post-UR nominal and effective rates of protection in general,
Jenkins and Siwisa (1997:32-33) observe that the manufacturing sector currently enjoys
a weighted nominal tariff of 16.6 per cent, compared to 6.4 per cent for the economy as a
whole. Post-UR implementation rates for bound nominal tariffs in manufacturing are
envisaged to fall to 7 per cent, and for the entire economy to 4 per cent, with the motor
vehicle sector experiencing a decrease of 21 per cent. As noted in the WTO Trade Policy
Review on South Africa, the process of rationalisation has resulted in a tariff structure
with zero or very low tariffs but which could still escalate and therefore increase  effective
rates of protection (WTO, 1998:xii).
The summary of average weighted import duties is reproduced in Table 3.6.
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Table 3.6: Summary of average weighted import duties
1994 2002 GATT binding
Consumption goods 34 17 26
Intermediate goods 8 4 11
Capital goods 11 5 15
Average all manufactures 15 7 16
Source: Jenkins and Siwisa (1997:20).
Effective rates of protection, however, still exhibit considerable variance, and show drastic
changes in the level of protection for certain industries. According to Jenkins and Siwisa
(1997:34), this can be attributed to reduced protection on certain inputs into some
industries which had hitherto been protected, and also to a reduced level of output. The
overall EPR level declines from 58.9 per cent to 34.7 per cent for the manufacturing sector,
and from 11.7 per cent to 7.2  per cent for the whole economy. For the motor vehicle
industry, post-liberalisation nominal rates of protection fall to 36.7 per cent from the
previous 58.5 per cent, while EPRs decline from 901.1 per cent to 537.7 per cent.
One of the first major casualties of the UR has been the GEIS, abolished in line with WTO
rules prohibiting subsidies to exporting firms. Formally wound up in July 1997, it has been
replaced by fiscal incentives. According to McCarthy (1998:72), these include accelerated
depreciation allowances for firms investing in new manufacturing plant and machinery at
an annual rate of 10 per cent for ten years. This compares favourably with the prevailing
annual rate of 5 per cent for twenty years. Equipment now faces an accelerated annual
depreciation rate of 33.3 per cent over three years as opposed to the present 20 per cent
over five years. The introduction of tax holidays for new investment in pre-approved
projects meeting certain criteria such as domestic value added, human resource
development and foreign exchange conservation is a second fiscal incentive.
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Other supply side interventionist measures include customs duty drawbacks and pre-
shipment export guarantee programmes for small and medium-scale enterprises, together
with support for industrial innovation, human resource development and investment
promotion schemes (Jenkins and Siwisa 1997:17). 
Jenkins and Siwisa (1997:21) observe that the trade reforms since 1990 have not been part
of a general  formal structural adjustment programme, and hence  have occurred largely
in response to the various problems which have arisen in the economy. While the WTO
agreement only provided a framework for trade liberalisation in South Africa, the current
wave of trade liberalisation has, in recent years, had to comply with WTO rules and
regulations. As Matona (1995:15) notes, the GATT/WTO determined pace of liberalisation
effectively takes precedence over the cautious and halting approach hitherto adopted by
the authorities, implying that trade liberalisation measures will enjoy a measure of
credibility due to the country’s adherence to WTO tariff bindings and regulations.
As Table 3.6 suggests, however, average tariffs in all categories will be far  below the WTO
bindings by the year 2002, creating considerable concern that  the government will have
some leeway for policy reversal while still fulfilling its obligations under the new trade order.
The government is, however, adamant that there is no going back on the reforms in place,
arguing that the aim of the lower tariffs is to weed out inefficient players in industry, pitting
only those with a competitive edge against international producers. 
According to Roberts (1998:27), tariff reforms are a necessary part of a broad restructuring
of industry which, with some exceptions, is not internationally competitive; the underlying
aim of tariff reduction thus is to reorient industry towards a form of competition based on
investment in new technologies, human resource development and ultimately improve
competitiveness in a manner consistent with rising wage levels and productivity.
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In a study conducted by the IDC on the impact of accelerated tariff reduction on South
Africa’s economy in the context of currency depreciation (IDC, 1997b), it is argued that
both the current tariff liberalisation and real currency depreciation will ultimately have a
positive effect on both exports and economic growth (IDC, 1997b:16). The immediate
impact of currency depreciation is to raise the price of imported inputs. For hitherto highly
protected industries, tariff liberalisation could result in greatly increased competition from
imports; to alleviate the pain of adjustment for these industries, accelerated tariff
reduction could be implemented more gradually than in other sectors, and supply-side
measures introduced to minimise adverse side effects (IDC, 1997b:16-17).
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Table 3.7: A Summary of Trade Policy Reform in South Africa
Year(s)             Policy change, important commissions, relevant events
1925-1972       The period of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) 
1925              Adoption of ISI with the Customs Tariff and Excise Duty Amendment Act
1948              Introduction of QRs
1958              Viljoen Commission recommends continued ISI, but using tariffs rather than  QRs or subsidies
1969              South Africa announces its intention to lift QRs, under pressure from GATT  and  the IMF, but does              
                   nothing
1972-83          The first trade liberalisation episode
1972               Reynders Commission recommends export promotion
1972               Export incentive measures are introduced
1972-76          Some relaxation of QRs
1975-79          The Rand is devalued
1978               Further assistance to exporters is introduced in line with the van Huyssteen                                                      
      Committee’s proposals
1979-80          The Rand appreciates sharply
1983-91          The second trade liberalisation episode
1983               Kleu Study Group recommends a move away from ISI
1983-85          The reduction of QRs is resumed
1983               The dual exchange rate system is abolished
1983-85          The external value of the Rand falls sharply
1985               Government white paper recommends a dual approach to industrial policy: ISI and export promotion
1985               Debt crisis; dual exchange rate system is reintroduced
1985               Substantial import surcharges introduced
1987               BTI begins to move proactively toward trade policy reform
1989               QR removal continues
1989               “Structural adjustment” export incentives introduced for clothing, textiles,                                                       
                   automobiles and automobile components
1990              General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS) is introduced
1990              The phasing out of the import surcharge begins; not completed
1991              An accelerated depreciation tax scheme is introduced
Current          The third trade liberalisation episode
1994              The conversion of QRs into tariffs is completed
1995              Import surcharges are eliminated 
1995              Tariff reduction in line with GATT requirements begins
1995              The financial Rand is abolished 
1995              Negotiations with the European Union over trade preferences commence
1996              The SADC free trade protocol is signed
1997              Further exchange control liberalisation is announced
Source: Adapted from Jenkins and Siwisa (1997:50).
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3.7 Conclusion
From Table 3.7, it can be seen that the direction of trade policy in South Africa is
increasingly being influenced by the neo-liberal approach to international trade, discussed
in Section 2.3.2. This approach is the cornerstone of policy recommendations advocated by
multilateral organisations like the WTO.
The neo-liberal approach recommends, firstly, the replacement of non-tariff barriers, which
serve the purpose of maintaining a country’s external balance, with a high uniform tariff.
This in turn is scaled down when the country can accommodate the liberalisation without
risking a foreign exchange crisis. Lower tariffs also correct any distortions in production and
discourage lobbying and rent-seeking behaviour by interest groups (Thomas and Nash,
1992:41). For the automotive industry in South Africa, QRs were replaced by a high
uniform tariff of 115 per cent. Since 1995, this high tariff has been subjected to a rapid
phase-down (Table 3.4), which is in excess of WTO requirements.
The next step after relaxation of QRs is the reduction of export incentives, such as tax and
duty rebates and import and excise duty exemptions. These are perceived by neo-liberal
theorists as not having the desired effect on exports, primarily because they are open to
fraud (such as over-invoicing and the export of fictitious goods) and rent-seeking
behaviour, not to mention the possibility of macroeconomic instability and high debt
problems. Export incentives have been outlawed by the WTO. For the automotive industry
in South Africa, the duty drawback system has been phased out and replaced by the
import-export complementation scheme of the MIDP; the SVI is to be gradually phased out
after 2002.
The final stage in the process of liberalisation, according to the neo-liberal standpoint, is
exchange rate depreciation, which is predicted to make exports more attractive, reduce
the anti-export bias and ultimately boost foreign exchange reserves. However, as will be
seen in Table 4.1, this appears not to have been the case for the automotive industry in
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South Africa, as the trade balance has consistently remained in deficit, and generally
worsened since 1990.
This chapter set out to examine trade policy in South Africa from the mid 1920s to the
present (see summary in Table 3.7). It found that, with time, emphasis has shifted from
production for a protected domestic market to the aggressive promotion of manufactured
exports. In the automotive sector, this has led to the abolition of the local content
requirement and the rapid phase down in tariff protection for domestic motor vehicle
assemblers and component manufacturers.
The chapter provides important background for the rest of the study, which focuses on the
economic implications of trade liberalisation for the automotive industry in the Eastern
Cape Province.
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CHAPTER 4
THE RISE OF THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA,
WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE EASTERN CAPE PROVINCE
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter served to provide a history of various trade policies undertaken by
South Africa from the mid 1920s to the present day. It also examined the various aspects
of trade liberalisation that the country has gone through, with specific emphasis on the
automotive sector. This chapter will take a more detailed look at the state of the motor
vehicle assembly industry and allied component sectors in the Eastern Cape Province. The
chapter is purposefully descriptive, and provides important background for the empirical
analysis that follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief general history of the automotive industry
in South Africa, while Section 4.3 examines the assembly industry in the Eastern Cape in
particular. The components sector is considered in Section 4.4, and Section 4.5 looks at
employment in the industry as a whole.
4.2 Historical Background
The first motor vehicle arrived in South Africa towards the end of 1896. The influx of
imported fully built up units (FBUs) grew rapidly until the post World War I era, when the
government adopted an inward-looking import substituting industrialisation (ISI) policy.
This, coupled with the increasing cost of shipping FBUs, acted as an incentive to the world’s
leading motor vehicle  manufacturers to establish operations in South Africa.
Ford Motor Corporation and General Motors (GM) were the first motor vehicle
manufacturers to establish assembly plants in South Africa (both in Port Elizabeth) in 1924
and 1926 respectively. This was done on the premise that setting up assembly plants close
to their intended markets would greatly lower transport costs by increasing the volume of
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imports in the form of completely knocked-down (CKD) kits (Adler, 1993:22). This
resulted in a phenomenal increase in vehicle sales from 13 547 units to 20 456 units between
1925 and 1929. Nominal sales values rose from £2 573 000 to £5 365 000 in the same period
(Julius and Lumby, 1993:12; Duncan, 1993:85).
The onset of the Great Depression in the 1930s resulted in a severe contraction in the
fledgling industry. This proved only temporary, however, as by 1937 a peak of 57 536
vehicles worth £10 227 000 was registered. Despite the entry of a third assembly firm, the
National Motor Assembly of Johannesburg, in 1939, the outbreak of World War II halted
the expansion of imports and sales. This was due to foreign exchange rationing and the
channelling of resources to the war effort. 
It was not until 1945 that further assembly plants were established in Durban and East
London, namely Motor Assemblers and Car Distributors Assembly respectively. The
Chrysler Corporation established a plant in Cape Town, closely followed by South African
Motor Assemblers and Distributors (SAMAD) in Uitenhage in 1948. There was a
heightened demand for motor vehicles, despite the introduction of import quotas for CKD
kits. The quotas did not deter the establishment in 1955 of an assembly plant in Cape Town
by the British Motor Corporation.
The second phase of automotive industrial development was prompted by the  balance of
payments crisis in the late 1950s due to the relaxation of import controls. It was realised
that assembly firms had neglected manufacturing operations and the local sourcing of
components, other than easily produced ones such as tyres, batteries and windscreens. As
Adler (1993:32) notes, local sourcing would provide massive foreign exchange savings and
enhance further employment opportunities for what had become an important sector of
manufacturing industry, with a 10 000 strong workforce in automotive assembly and 82 000
in component manufacturing. These personnel earned nearly £500 000 and £36 million in
wages respectively.  According to Dix (1995:25), it was further envisioned by the
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government of the day that the establishment of a fully fledged motor vehicle
manufacturing industry would catalyse the development of steel, engineering and
metalworking industries.
It is for these reasons that the Board of Trade and Industry ordered an investigation into
the impact on the balance of payments of stimulating the local manufacture of motor
vehicles. The publication of the report into the investigation heralded Phase I of the local
content programme. Introduced in 1961, it aimed at compelling vehicle manufacturers to
source from domestic suppliers a list of eleven domestically produced items. These were
tyres and tubes,  batteries, trim, exhaust systems, paint, glass, seat frames, road springs,
carpets and mats, which had to comprise 20 per cent of each vehicle’s local content. An
incentive was further offered in the form of additional import permits for any manufacturer
who attained a local content of more than 20 per cent. Duncan (1997:26) notes that this
reduced the drain on foreign exchange from R145.6 million (out of a total expenditure of
R941.4 million) in 1960 to R110.6 million out of a total import expenditure of R812 million
in 1961.
Phase II of the local content programme, commencing  in 1964, raised this minimum level
to 25 per cent, as well as making a distinction between assembled and manufactured
models. According to Duncan (1993:74), the former had to have a minimum of 45 per cent
local content (by weight) to be increased to 50 per cent within 42 months, an incentive
being the free issue of import permits. Assembled components faced a sliding scale penalty,
with bonus import licences being issued for local content achieved in the previous year.
Nonetheless, by the time it was being phased out, Phase II had failed miserably in its goal
of stemming the proliferation of assembly operations. By 1970 all manufacturers were
required to have achieved a 50 percent local content.
After a year-long moratorium, Phase III was introduced in 1971. This envisaged a local
content of 66 per cent by weight for manufactured models within a six-year time span, with
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semi-manufactured models required to have at least 52 per cent local content. Phase IV,
introduced in1977, did not impose further local content requirements, but was rather
intended as a period in which manufacturers could consolidate their position following the
stringent conditions imposed upon them by Phase III (Dix, 1995:28).  In this phase, excise
rebates were used to encourage production of vehicles with a local content exceeding 71
per cent. Phase V, launched in 1979, extended the 66 per cent local content requirement
to commercial vehicles, to be achieved within two years. 
The early 1980s saw the motor industry face a downturn. This was further exacerbated by
the global financial recession and South Africa’s own debt crisis, together with labour
unrest and political instability.
A 1988 study by the  Board on Tariffs and Trade (BTT), which had succeeded the BTI,
concluded that, contrary to expectations, there had been no improvement in the net use
of foreign exchange by the industry.  Dix (1995:31) observes that this scenario arose due to
the fact that increasing levels of local content required more sophisticated, capital-
intensive components to be sourced locally; the  technology and equipment to produce
these components  were unavailable locally and thus had to be imported. Over-invoicing
of components supplied to local firms by parent companies is also a possible reason for the
non-improvement of net foreign exchange usage.
Hence, as discussed in Section 3.4, 1989 saw the introduction of  Phase VI. This involved
a shift in the measurement of local content from weight to value,  and expected the
rationalisation of locally produced models. Whereas the motor industry was ineligible for
subsidies under the General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS), local manufacturers stood
to benefit from an import/export incentive scheme. This involved local manufacturers
rebating the cost of imported components against the value of their exports. Import/export
complementation was further enhanced under the Motor Industry Development
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Programme (MIDP), with exporters of vehicles and components earning export credits to
offset the import of vehicles and components.
The trade balance for the automotive industry from 1990 to 1997 is shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 Trade balance for the automotive industry (Rbn, current prices)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Imports 6.3 6.3 6.6 9.1 12.0 16.4 19.2 17.2
Exports 0.8 1.1 1.5 2.3 2.8 4.2 5.1 6.6
Foreign exchange
usage
5.5 5.2 5.1 6.8 9.2 12.2 14.1 10.6
Source: Department of Trade and Industry (1998a:13).
It can be seen that, despite the intentions of the BTT, there has been no improvement in
the use of foreign exchange by the industry except in 1997, when the deficit fell to R10.6
billion.
Table 4.2: Motor vehicle assembly firms operating in South Africa
Assembler Ownership Makes assembled Percentage share of passenger vehicle 
market
Automakers Nissan
Sankorp
Nissan
Fiat
6.4
BMW SA BMW AG BMW
Landrover
5.8
Delta Local/GM Opel 11.2
DaimlerChrysler SA DaimlerCrysler AG Mercedes-Benz
Honda
8.1
Samcor Amic/Ford Ford
Mazda
13.6
Toyota Local (JSE)/TMC Toyota 22.0
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Volkswagen SA VW AG Volkswagen
Audi
18.7
Source: Black (1998a:4).
As Table 4.2 demonstrates, there are currently seven motor vehicle assembly firms in South
Africa that are affiliated to the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers of
South Africa (NAAMSA). These firms, together with the few non-NAAMSA members,
accounted for the production, import and sale of 203 821 passenger vehicles in 1998, as well
as the export of 18 342 units. However, given that these volumes are spread over 22 model
variants, and the fact that the South African market is small, the motor industry is unable
to attain economies of scale. Model proliferation further puts strain on component
manufacturers in terms of tooling costs for so many different types of motor vehicles.
Since 1997, a culmination of domestic and foreign events, such as currency depreciation,
industrial action, not to mention the emerging market crisis and financial market
instability, has seen the market for passenger vehicles decline from over 273 000 units to
an estimated 215 000 units at the end of 1999, although the situation is forecast to improve
after 2000 (Figure 4.1).
-64-
0 
50000 
100000 
150000 
200000 
250000 
300000 
N
um
be
r o
f u
ni
ts
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999* 2000* 2001*
Year
Locally Manufactured FBU Exports
FBU Imports TOTAL
Figure 4.1: The local market for passenger cars
Notes: 
(1) Figures for 1999-2001 are NAAMSA projections.
(2) FBU imports are both NAAMSA and non-NAAMSA.
Source: NAAMSA (1999a).
Figure 4.1 demonstrates that since the introduction of the MIDP in 1995, the  volume of
FBU imports has greatly exceeded that of exports, although it is expected that this gap will
narrow from 1999 onwards, when the majority of assemblers increase their export volumes.
Table 4.3 serves to illustrate volume performance by model lines of motor vehicles currently
produced in South Africa from 1992 to 1997.
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Table 4.3:  Volume performance by passenger vehicle model lines
Annual production
volume
Number of model lines
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
0- 9 999 10 8 8 10 9 12
10 000-19 999 9 8 8 7 8 7
20 000-29 999 0 0 1 3 3 2
30 000+ 1 1 1 1 1 1
Models manufactured
in the year
20 17 18 21 21 22
Source: Department of Trade and Industry (1998a:18).
Since the early 1990s, exports of both components and motor vehicles have dramatically
risen, a factor which can partly be attributed to the import/export complementation
arrangements of Phase VI and the MIDP, as well as assembly firms becoming increasingly
integrated into the operations of their overseas-based parent companies (see Chapter 5).
The value of component and vehicle exports is shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4:  Motor vehicle and component exports (FOB values, Rm in 
current prices) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999*
Components 287 523 832 1 307 1 550 2 450 4 051 5 367 6 732 7 500
Vehicles 381 392 419 581 695 900 750 1 600 2 100 5 500
TOTAL 668 915 1 251 1 888 2 245 3 350 4 801 6 967 8 832 13 000
Note: 1999 figures are NAAMSA forecasts.
Source: NAAMSA (1999a).
10This category does not include SAMCOR which, while principally a motor vehicle
assembler and member of NAAMSA, has a plant in Port Elizabeth wholly dedicated to
manufacturing engines for export. SAMCOR’s assembly activities are to be found in Pretoria.
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4.3 The Motor Vehicle Assembly Industry in the Eastern Cape10
A 1997 Report on Provincial Industrial Development by the Industrial Development
Corporation (IDC) identifies the automotive industry in the Eastern Cape as contributing
39.9 per cent of the total manufactured output of motor vehicles in South Africa, together
with 24.1 per cent of total manufacturing employment in the Province (IDC, 1997d:4). The
manufacture of motor vehicles, parts and accessories alone is reported to add almost 50 per
cent of the total manufacturing value added of all goods in the Province (Hosking and
Lloyd, 1999, cited in Hosking, 1999:8).
Within the Province, vehicle assembly is dominated by Volkswagen of South Africa
(VWSA), Delta Motor Corporation and DaimlerChrysler South Africa (DCSA). Between
them, the three firms accounted for 42.5 per cent of all new passenger vehicle sales
countrywide in 1998, and 68.6 per cent of exports.  The volume of exports by VWSA, Delta
and DCSA vis-a-vis national export volumes is shown in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Passenger vehicle exports from Eastern-Cape based assemblers
Note: 1999 figures are for the year to September.
Source: NAAMSA (1990-1999j).
From Figure 4.2, it can be seen that passenger vehicle exports from Eastern Cape-based
vehicle assemblers have largely been the driving force behind the phenomenal increase in
exports since 1996. This can be attributed to the lucrative export contracts for the supply
of both FBUs and CKD kits awarded by parent companies. The downturn in exports in 1996
arose due to the cessation of VWSA’s contract to export over 10 000 units to China.
However, from 1998 onwards, in particular, there has been a marked improvement in export
volumes from the Province as a result of the assembly firms becoming increasingly integrated
into their parent companies’ global networks, and also because of the incentives which the
import/export complementation scheme of the MIDP present (see Chapter 5). There are
indications that if the current export levels are maintained, then the number of passenger
FBU exports will more than double those of 1998, although still falling well below the 70 000
units envisaged by NAAMSA (see Figure 4.1).
11Small cars are classified as those with a cylinder capacity of 1 400cc and below, while
medium sized cars have a cylinder capacity of between 1 400 and 2 000cc, and large cars  2 000cc
and above.
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4.3.1 Volkswagen of South Africa (VWSA) Pty
VWSA is a wholly owned subsidiary of the giant German automobile manufacturer
Volkswagenwerk AG. Located in Uitenhage, just north of Port Elizabeth, VWSA was
created when the German firm took over the operations of SAMAD. The company is not
only the biggest  motor vehicle assembly concern in the Eastern Cape, but is also the largest
employer in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage metropolis, directly employing  5 000 people.
Besides manufacturing vehicles under the Volkswagen marque, the company also produces
cars under the Audi marque, and is responsible for the import of FBUs under the two brands
(Table 4.5).
Table 4.5: Models manufactured and imported by VWSA11
MAKE SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
VOLKSWAGEN
CitiGolf
Polo
Golf
Jetta
1
1
-
2
2
2
2
-
-
2
2
AUDI
A4
A6*
A8*
-
-
-
1
-
-
2
2
2
*Denotes imported FBUs.
Source: NAAMSA (1998a).
VWSA’s share of nationwide total retail sales between 1990 and1998 is shown in Table 4.6.
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Table 4.6: VWSA’s share of national passenger vehicle sales
YEAR NO. OF VEHICLES PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL
TOTAL
1990 41 012 19.6
1991 39 757 20.1
1992 33 111 18.1
1993 35 172 18.2
1994 35 412 18.6
1995 53 925 22.8
1996 57 691 23.1
1997 50 176 20.1
1998 43 266 21.2
Source: NAAMSA (1990-1998a).
The phenomenal increase in vehicle sales from 1994 to1995 can be attributed to the
introduction of the Volkswagen CitiGolf, an inexpensive reliable car, which quickly
established a niche for itself in the entry-level range and which in its year of launch was
billed the most affordable car in South Africa. 1995 also witnessed rapid growth in
nationwide car sales.
With regard to exports, VWSA has in the past secured lucrative contracts to supply
vehicles overseas. Between 1993 and1996, for instance, the company exported a total of 12
500 cars to China. With the cessation of the contract, however, VWSA was faced with idle
plant capacity, by 1996 producing only 80 000 out of a possible 120 000 cars annually. With
only 40 per cent of its plant capacity being utilised, the firm was  awarded a contract by the
parent company in 1998 to assemble and export 60 000 fourth generation Volkswagen Golf
cars to right hand drive export markets.  The value of this export order in foreign exchange
terms alone represents 12 per cent of the total value of South Africa’s manufactured goods
in 1997 terms, and 20 per cent of net gold exports (Eastern Province Herald, 12 May 1998).
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This was envisaged to more than double the existing annual output of 58 000 cars, increase
employment by 1 000 and expand the production line at a cost of R150 million (Eastern
Province Herald, 12 May 1998). This contract was  extended later in the year to cover the
entire lifespan of the series. In February 1999, VWSA announced a further R300 million
capital investment at its Uitenhage plant with spin-offs going to local manufacturers and
motorists, who would benefit from the introduction of the fourth generation Golf into the
domestic market (Eastern Province Herald, 23 February 1999). This development serves to
reaffirm VWSA’s importance as a world class supplier of FBUs to the VWAG Group, despite
the disadvantage posed by South Africa’s geographical location (Maergner, 1998).
4.3.2 Delta Motor Corporation
Delta Motor Corporation was formed in 1987, when General Motors divested itself of its
loss-making South African interests in the wake of the international imposition of economic
sanctions against the country. The resulting management buyout made  Delta  wholly
locally-owned. However, in early 1998, General Motors reacquired a 49 per cent stake in the
company.
Delta operates two large manufacturing plants in Port Elizabeth, located at Struandale and
in Kempston Road. The former is wholly dedicated to the manufacture of cars under the
Opel marque under licence from Adam Opel AG of Germany, and is reported to be the first
new automobile assembly plant to be opened in South Africa in twenty years (Engineering
News, March 21, 1997). Kempston Road also manufactures Isuzu LDVs (which fall outside
the scope of this study). Besides its manufacturing operations, Delta also acts as the local
franchise holder for the import of Swedish Saab vehicles and Japanese Suzukis. Delta
directly employs a 4 500 strong workforce, with a further 18 000 people dependent on the
company through supplier and related industries in the Port Elizabeth metropolis
(Engineering News, March 21, 1997).
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The Opel automobiles manufactured by Delta can be classified into three different models,
the Corsa, Kadett and Astra. These in turn vary considerably with regard to levels of trim
and engine size, resulting in a total of nine different models. There are also five different
imported models (Table 4.7).
Table 4.7: Models manufactured and imported by Delta
MAKE SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
OPEL
Corsa*
Kadett
Astra
1
1
1
-
2
2
-
1
1
SAAB
900SE
9000
-
-
-
-
1
-
SUZUKI
Samurai
Vitara
1 -
2
-
1
* includes the Corsa LDV which, while produced on the same platform, is  classified as a commercial vehicle.
Source: NAAMSA (1998a).
From the above table, it can be seen that Delta mainly targets the medium sized category,
although if levels of trim and accessories are taken into account, the small car category
boasts a larger variety. With a large majority of these vehicles priced at under R100 000,
Delta’s main focus is therefore high volume, low priced vehicles.
Delta’s market share of nationwide motor vehicle sales rose from 10.4 per cent in 1990 to
12.5 per cent in 1997, with lows of 9.0 per cent being registered in 1993 and 1996 (Table 4.8).
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Table 4.8: Delta’s share of national passenger vehicle sales
YEAR NO. OF CARS SOLD PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL
TOTAL
1990 21 774 10.4
1991 20 959 10.6
1992 12 277 9.5
1993 17 324 9.0
1994 20 660 10.8
1995 24 215 10.2
1996 22 554 9.0
1997 29 971 12.5
1998 20 258 9.8
Source: NAAMSA (1990-1998a).
In 1997, Delta embarked on a three year R1.2 billion expansion programme with the
objectives of introducing new products and expanding existing facilities in an exercise aimed
at increasing plant capacity to 105 000 passenger and commercial vehicles annually, and
raising market share to between 15 and 17 per cent (Engineering  News, March 21 1997).
Whereas Delta has a modest share of national passenger vehicle exports, the company
focuses mainly on the exports of original equipment components to the global GM/Opel
network. The company is one of the few GM/Opel original equipment manufacturers fully
integrated into the parent company’s network, with component exports reaching a value of
R500 million in 1996.
In late 1998, Delta announced that it had secured two lucrative component supply
contracts. The first of these was a year long R20 million contract to supply Opel Germany
with automotive press tooling dyes. Following closely on this announcement was the
disclosure that it had been awarded a two year R100 million contract to supply General
Motors Brazil with seat components for the Opel Corsa range. This contract, to be fulfilled
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in conjunction with Port Elizabeth-based component firm Dorbyl Automotive Technologies,
is expected to create 100 extra jobs in the city (Cartoday, 1998c). Other positive spinoffs
associated with this contract include the attainment of scale economies in the production
of metal seat frames and the supply of steel, developments which place the firm at the heart
of global sourcing strategies by General Motors.
4.3.3 DaimlerChrysler South Africa (DCSA) Pty
DaimlerChrysler South Africa (DCSA) is the successor to Mercedes-Benz of South Africa.
The name change was a result of the parent company Daimler Benz AG of Germany
merging with American automobile manufacturer Chrysler to form DaimlerChrysler AG.
DCSA is the only Eastern Cape automotive concern located outside the Port Elizabeth-
Uitenhage area, based in East London, and was originally formed as Car Distributors
Assembly. The company manufactures and imports a wide range of vehicles under the
Mercedes-Benz and Honda marques, as well as assembling the Mitsubishi Colt LDV. 
DCSA is the smallest of the Eastern Cape based vehicle manufacturers affiliated to
NAAMSA in terms of sales. While the firm has traditionally targeted the upper echelons
of the automobile market, especially in the import of FBUs, there has, in recent years, been
a shift to smaller cars which have a higher volume of sales. 1993 marked the onset of the
company’s export programme, which was sanctioned by the parent company Mercedes-Benz
AG. This has seen the company, while registering a modest share of nationwide automotive
sales, exporting a number of motor vehicles to the rest of Africa (800 Mercedes-Benz and
Honda), Australia and Europe (1 200 Mercedes-Benz) in 1997, from a modest total of 42
vehicles in 1991. This is mainly a result of integration into the worldwide Mercedes-Benz
manufacturing network (South African Transport, March/April 1997:68).
The different models of cars manufactured and imported by DCSA are classified in Table
4.9.
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Table 4.9:  Models produced and imported by DCSA
MAKE SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
MERCEDES-BENZ
C CLASS
E CLASS**
S CLASS*
OTHER*
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
5
5
3
2
HONDA
BALLADE
OTHER*
-
-
3
-
-
5
* denotes imported FBUs.
** imported in CKD form, with final assembly taking place in East London.
Source: NAAMSA (1998a).
DCSA’s contribution to nationwide car sales is shown in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10: DCSA’s share of national passenger vehicle sales
YEAR VOLUME PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL
TOTAL
1990 14 340 6.8
1991 15 756 8.0
1992 18 240 10.0
1993 19 895 10.3
1994 20 725 10.9
1995 26 718 11.3
1996 25 182 10.1
1997 21 699 9.1
1998 17 791 8.7
Source: NAAMSA (1990-1998a).
The Mercedes-Benz component export programme for 1997 mainly consisted of leather trim
and seat covers which the company supplies to the global DaimlerChrysler network. Other
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notable components manufactured included exhaust manifolds and catalytic converters,
electrical components, brake linings and brake pads, glass, alloy wheels, plastic  bumpers and
sill plates, at a cost of R960 million (South African Transport, March/April 1997:67).
In November 1998, DCSA’s parent company DaimlerChrysler announced a R900 million
investment programme aimed at expanding production at the East London plant.  It was
envisaged that this programme would boost the assembly of the Mercedes-Benz C-Class
range both for domestic and right-hand drive export markets. Besides making use of
DCSA’s spare plant capacity, the programme was expected to have a significant  local
content and create an additional 10 000 jobs in the Eastern Cape Province alone (Cartoday,
1998b).
This investment was raised to R1.3 billion in October 1999, when the firm unveiled its plans
to make the East London plant a major export centre (Cartoday, 1999b). The bulk of this
investment (mainly in new paint and body shops, computer systems and automation) is
principally aimed at boosting current production and exports of the current C-class model.
In addition, DCSA announced that the firm had been awarded exclusive rights to supply
the world with the right-hand drive version of the forthcoming C-class model, with
production of 40 000-45 000 units per annum expected to start from August 2000 (Cartoday,
1999d).
For VWSA, Delta and DCSA, all these developments imply some degree of rationalisation
of production platforms. This is necessary if economies of scale and high export volumes are
to be achieved, with the resulting export credits being used to offset the cost of importing
low-volume models. Both VWSA and DaimlerChrysler have reduced the number of model
platforms and focused on high-volume models, with the latter discontinuing assembly of the
E-class, and VWSA concentrating on the Golf IV and Jetta IV range besides the CitiGolf
and Polo models.
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4.4 The Components Sector
Automotive components form an integral part of the motor industry. According to Hoffman
and Kaplinsky (1988:106-108), they can be classified in a continuum as follows.
(i) Generic components: these include nuts, bolts, screws, fasteners and the like,
physically small in size and common to many industries but which generally comprise
less than one per cent of total component cost.
(ii) Bulky non-mechanical parts: examples of these are exhaust mufflers, glass,
stampings, seats, radiators and fuel tanks. They have little technological content
and, owing to their relatively high transport-to-value ratio, are usually manufactured
close to their final market (the assembly firms).
(iii) Items of trim and wiring: these comprise wiring harnesses, window winders,
exterior trim, interior upholstery, spark plugs, points and windscreen wipers, all of
which have a low technological content and low transport costs.    
(iv) Electro-mechanical and systems components: these technologically complex items
include carburettors, clutches, starter motors and ignition systems, brakes, shock
absorbers and steering mechanisms.
(v) Core technologies: examples of core technologies are engines, transmissions and
gearboxes, the production of which requires heavy design costs, labour-intensive
assembly and economies of scale in production.
The components sector in South Africa has generally evolved around automotive assembly
plants. In the early stages of the development of the motor industry, component producing
firms mainly manufactured simple parts like tyres, glass and batteries. According to Duncan
(1997:164), in the years before World War II, component firms enjoyed little or no
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protection, in comparison to the motor vehicle assemblers. However, in the post World War
II era, the components sector diversified into engineering, metalworking and upholstery
(Duncan, 1997:164). With time, component manufacturing firms have diversified into the
production of  more complex items like catalytic converters, engines and transmission
assemblies.
As Duncan (1997:65) observes, the beginning of the 1960s, which coincided with the
introduction of local content programmes, marked a change in the trend of establishing
component manufacturing firms. Whereas local firms had in the past acted as importers and
distributors of overseas (mainly European) components, the European MNCs set up locally
based manufacturing concerns in partnership with their local agents. This not only
facilitated the domestic manufacture of components under licence, with components
bearing brand names of the foreign principals, but also allowed for a measure of technology
transfer. Barnes (1999:7) notes that the introduction of local content programmes and the
increasingly closed nature of the economy assured locally based component manufacturers
(whether competitive or not) of a ready market in the form of domestic motor vehicle
assemblers. 
However, with the advent of the MIDP, new demands have been placed on these local
component manufacturing firms, which now have to conform to specified performance
targets in order to satisfy local assemblers, or face the risk of losing business to foreign MNC
component manufacturers.
According to the DTI (1998a:5-7), both import and export values and volumes of
components have continued to increase, with component firms facing increased competition
from imports under the MIDP’s import/export complementation scheme, forcing them to
expand exports and link up with other domestic or foreign firms, in an attempt to improve
production efficiencies.
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The value of component exports is shown in Table 4.11.
Table 4.11: Exports of components (FOB values, Rm in current prices)
1994 1995 1996 1997 Percentage of
1997 total
Stitched leather seat covers 464 1 019 1 259 1 408 27.5
Catalytic converters 197 388 485 835 16.3
Tyres 132 219 296 342 6.7
Road wheels and parts 77 175 227 325 6.4
Automotive tooling 165 259 279 309 6.0
Engine parts 61 112 137 285 5.6
Silencers/exhaust pipes 181 76 170 151 3.0
Engines 11 10 86 111 2.2
Glass 59 49 71 105 2.1
Radiators 44 44 107 93 1.8
Batteries 31 53 60 88 1.7
Shock absorbers 18 38 53 56 1.1
Filters - 13 42 55 1.1
Body parts and panels 48 18 39 39 0.8
Brake parts 11 23 29 38 0.7
Clutches/shaft couplings 2 16 21 33 0.6
Ignition/starting equipment 25 4 16 30 0.6
Car radios 1 7 4 29 0.6
Gauges/instruments/parts 22 18 28 29 0.6
Jacks 14 13 21 24 0.5
Other components 528 731 621 730 14.3
Total Component Exports 2 091 3 318 4 051 5 115 100
Source: Department of Trade and Industry (1998a:11).
From Table 4.11, it can be observed that despite the increase in value of component exports,
the bulk of these exports, such as leather covers, are relatively peripheral items as far as a
motor vehicle’s value added is concerned. They are also labour-intensive in production, and
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with the exception of catalytic converters, automotive tooling and engine parts, require little
technological deepening.
Most of the component sector’s exports are destined for the European Union member
states, with Germany being the largest single customer (Table 4.12).
Table 4.12: Geographical destination of component exports (percentages)
Country/Region 1995 1996 1997
By country
Germany 45.0 47.1 48.9
United Kingdom 6.4 8.0 9.5
Zimbabwe 4.4 5.9 6.5
United States 4.2 5.0 6.4
Belgium 8.0 6.2 4.6
Netherlands 1.9 3.0 2.4
Australia 0.7 1.3 2.3
France 0.6 0.7 2.1
Zambia 1.7 1.9 2.1
Other 27.1 20.9 15.3
By Region
EU 67.7 69.7 70.7
Africa (excluding SADC) 3.0 1.1 1.2
SADC 10.2 13.5 12.7
North America 4.7 5.3 6.0
Source: Department of Trade and Industry (1998a:12).
Component manufacturing firms can be classified as follows:
(i) Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs): these are essentially the motor
vehicle assembly firms, and they produce parts for use within their own plants or for
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export, especially when they are integrated into the global network of their overseas-
based parent companies.
(ii) Original equipment suppliers (OESs): these tend to be controlled by the OEMs
and collect parts/sub-assemblies and systems from other  (second- and third-tier)
producers, assembling them into modules which are mostly supplied to OEMs or, in
some instances, exported.
(iii) After-market producers: after-market producers mainly manufacture parts for
domestic and foreign markets. These parts are principally for the repair of motor
vehicles, or for export to countries where the models in question are no longer in
production. This category also includes the reconditioning of automotive parts.
There are a number of component manufacturing firms in the Eastern Cape Province. The
larger ones in particular are affiliated to the National Association of Automotive
Component and Allied Manufacturers (NAACAM), although several smaller firms also
exist. Almost without exception, component manufacturing is concentrated in the Port
Elizabeth/Uitenhage metropolitan area, within close proximity to assembly firms. Most of the
larger firms are either subsidiaries of local firms or MNCs, or produce under licence from
the latter. In addition, the larger firms also operate one or more manufacturing plants within
a single town or region.
The nature of operations undertaken by Eastern Cape-based firms range from  beneficiation
of raw materials through to engine manufacturing, both for the domestic market and export,
and a number of firms have positioned themselves to take advantage of incentives and
benefits under the MIDP  since its inception.  The South African Motor Corporation
(Samcor), for instance, secured a lucrative R1.6 billion contract to supply 1 600cc fuel
injected engines to Ford Motor Corporation’s European plants (Eastern Province Herald,
2 June 1998), while as noted in Section 4.3.2, Delta Motor Corporation is involved in the
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export of tooling and seats to Europe and South America. Most  component firms also
export through the vehicle assemblers, and in so doing share or sell export credits earned
under the import/export complementation scheme of the MIDP. 
Barnes (1999:11) argues that the domestic OEM/OES and after-market are no longer
sufficient for the continued survival of component firms nationally, and with MNCs
controlling international marketing networks, there has been a trend towards domestic
assemblers being used as a conduit for component exports and/or establishing close
relationships with foreign MNCs. This is  usually achieved through the sale of equity stakes,
or sub-contracting relationships.  Entry into production agreements with major overseas
component producers is an act of survival on the part of domestic component producers,
since it allows them to fit in with global supply chains (Maphologela, 1999, cited in Hosking,
1999:13). This aspect will be examined more closely in Chapter 5.
4.5 Employment
The significance of the labour force engaged in production in South Africa’s automotive
industry is borne out by the fact that, by 1993, this sector  accounted for 5.9 per cent of total
manufacturing employment (CSS, 1993).
As the automotive industry began to take root in the post World War I era, the
government of the day perceived it, and other industrial sectors, as a panacea for the
nagging problem of finding employment for thousands of “poor whites” (Duncan, 1997:83).
Employers in the automotive sector were encouraged, formally and informally, to employ
white labour wherever possible. As a result, non-white labour was excluded from
employment in assembly plants. However, this situation changed with the outbreak of World
War II. The vast majority of white male workers were drafted into the military, and the
resulting vacuum led to the gradual absorption of black, Indian and coloured labour.
Although they largely performed menial tasks, their numbers rapidly increased after the end
of the war. 
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The increase in numbers occurred mainly because white labourers began shunning the
repetitive and monotonous assembly operations in favour of more lucrative job opportunities
in the rapidly expanding economy. With white labour increasingly expensive to hire,
employers began to turn to labourers of other races, especially to perform the tasks that
whites found demeaning. Efforts to exclude non-white labour from all but the most
rudimentary operations intensified, especially with the introduction of  the Industrial
Conciliation Act of 1956, which legalised job reservation (Julius and Lumby, 1993:12). 
Job reservation involved the demarcation of work types according to race group. The
intention, ostensibly to safeguard the welfare of employees of any race, only served to
exacerbate racial tensions within the industry. Rising numbers of labourers employed also
brought about increased levels of unionisation, and led to the birth of a strong labour
movement. According to Duncan (1997:86), the advent of the 1980s saw organised labour
begin to pose a real challenge to the government and management of assembly operations,
through a series of wildcat strikes. These were generally centred on issues such as wages,
working conditions and retrenchments, although the strikes usually bore strong political
overtones. The Eastern Cape-based vehicle assemblers were particularly hard hit by
continuous waves of strike action, which deeply affected levels of profitability and led to the
eventual divestiture of some firms.
The 1990s have witnessed relatively peaceful conditions prevailing in the sector, especially
with the establishment of the National Bargaining Forum. This involves industry-wide
negotiations across the assembly sector by stakeholders, namely the National Union of
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) and the automobile manufacturers (Duncan,
1997:102). While this has led to a gradual rationalisation of job grades, establishment of a
minimum wage and a moratorium on retrenchments, the industry is still beset by worrisome
strike action. This was manifested in the national strike called by NUMSA in August 1998,
which targeted both assembly and component firms alike, and which was perceived to have
put into question the viability of choosing South Africa as a manufacturing base.
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The relationship between unionised labour and management still remains, to a large extent,
adversarial, with labour voicing opposition particularly  with regard to job losses and the
perception that employers are manipulating the MIDP to achieve their own ends (Cartoday,
1999a).
Employment levels in the assembly and component sub-sectors remains volatile, which is
indicative of the pressures the industry faces (see Chapter 5).  While employment dropped
from 1990 to 1993, before picking up between 1993 and 1995, the steady decline thereafter
is indicative of rationalisation of operations and cost reduction, which has also seen the
closure of a number of firms (NAAMSA, 1998d).
Table 4.13: Labour force in the motor vehicle assembly and component sectors
YEAR VEHICLE ASSEMBLY COMPONENTS TOTAL
1990 43 800 44 300 88 100
1991 36 900 43 600 80 500
1992 38 700 36 400 75 100
1993 37 200 33 700 70 900
1994 32 700 40 800 73 500
1995 38 600 45 100 83 700
1996 38 600 43 500 82 100
1997 37 000 41 700 75 400
1998 33 700 41 700 73 700
Note: Employment figures rounded off to the nearest 100.
Source: NAAMSA (1999a).
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter set out to describe the evolution of the automotive industry in South Africa
and provide background on the motor vehicle assembly firms operating within the Eastern
Cape Province. It briefly described the evolution of the components sector and considered
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the changing nature of employment in the industry. The chapter may be seen as important
background to the rest of the study, which aims to analyse trends in the Eastern Cape
automotive industry, especially after 1990.
12VWSA declined to participate in the survey on the grounds that, as a wholly owned
subsidiary of VW AG, they were constrained from disclosing information regarding profits and other
issues of a sensitive nature.
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CHAPTER 5
TRENDS IN THE EASTERN CAPE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE EFFECTS OF TRADE
LIBERALISATION SINCE 1990
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter provided an overview of the evolution of South Africa’s automotive
industry from the turn of the century to the present day. It also examined the motor vehicle
assembly and component sectors in the Eastern Cape Province. This chapter specifically
analyses trends in the Eastern Cape automotive industry, with special reference to the
effects of trade liberalisation since 1990. It is based on the findings of two surveys: one of the
motor vehicle assembly firms in the Province, and a second covering all component
exporting firms in the Province affiliated to the National Association of Automobile
Component and Allied Manufacturers (NAACAM), together with the South African
Motor Corporation (SAMCOR) engine plant (see Appendices 1-3). Three non-exporting
component manufacturing firms were omitted from the survey. 
5.2 The motor vehicle assembly industry
As discussed in Section 4.3, there are three motor vehicle assemblers based in the Eastern
Cape. Volkswagen of South Africa (VWSA)12 and Delta Motor Corporation are based in
the Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage metropolitan area, while the DaimlerChrysler manufacturing
plant is based in East London. 
Both of the respondents reported an annual turnover of over R500 million, and each had a
labour force of between  2 000 and 4 000 personnel. The following sub-sections analyse
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the economic performance of the respondent firms and their views on the effects of trade
liberalisation.
5.2.1 Economic performance of assembly firms
The firms which participated in the survey were requested to rank on a scale of 1
(representing unimportant) to 5 (for very important) how the following factors influenced
their employment practices:
(a) growth in domestic markets;
(b) stagnation in domestic markets;
(c) growth in exports;
(d) reduction in exports;
(e) demands by organised labour;
(f) change in market focus.
The results are represented in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Factors influencing employment practices of assembly firms
Source: Interviews.
13This situation is not uncommon among global vehicle assemblers; Toyota Motor
Corporation of Japan also restrict exports by Toyota SA to particular countries, especially in
Southern Africa.
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From Figure 5.1, it can be seen that Delta perceived the growth or stagnation of domestic
markets to be of utmost significance in determining employment levels, whereas
DaimlerChrysler felt it was only moderately important. As noted in Section 4.3.2, a possible
explanation for this could be that Delta mainly targets the domestic market for FBU sales,
and is constrained from exploring new export markets overseas owing to spare capacity at
other General Motors facilities and the restriction of export destinations13.
DaimlerChrysler, on the other hand, is increasingly becoming an important location for
certain models in the Mercedes-Benz range of passenger vehicles, as noted in Section 4.3.3.
Of significant importance to both respondents was the growth or reduction of exports,
whereas demands by organised labour were not very important in the determination of
employment levels. It can be seen that Delta placed great significance on changing market
focus, whereas DaimlerChrysler felt it was moderately important. Once again, a possible
explanation for this, as observed in Section 4.3.2, could be the fact that despite constraints
on sales of FBUs to other markets, Delta is increasingly becoming integrated into the
General Motors global component sourcing network and supplies certain components to
various assembly plants worldwide. DaimlerChrysler, on the other hand, has fewer assembly
locations, and these are almost invariably located within the European Union.
The firms were also asked to indicate their principal export markets. The respondents
disclosed that they primarily exported to the European Union, SADC countries and the rest
of Africa. In addition, DaimlerChrysler identified North America as an important
destination for fully built up (FBU) and component exports. Delta further identified South
America  (Brazil) as a major destination for components.
The survey further sought to identify factors which influenced turnover the most. These
were ranked on a scale of 1 (for unimportant) to 5 (for very important) and are as follows:
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(a) increased domestic market share;
(b) stagnating domestic market share;
(c) decreasing domestic market share;
(d) growth in exports;
(e) stagnating exports;
(f) declining exports;
(g) changing market focus.
The findings are depicted in Figure 5.2
Figure 5.2: Factors influencing turnover of assembly firms
Sourc
e: Interviews.
From Figure 5.2, it can be seen that whereas Delta ranked the state of domestic market
share (increasing, stagnating or decreasing) as very important in determining annual
turnover, DaimlerChrysler felt that all these factors were only moderately significant. In
addition, Delta placed the state of exports (increasing, stagnant or declining) as quite
important in determining turnover. DaimlerChrysler, however, perceived increasing or
stagnating exports as very important in determining annual turnover, while decreasing
14For instance, DaimlerChrysler South Africa is the sole source of leather upholstery for
the Mercedes-Benz C-Class series produced all over the world.
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exports were seen as quite important. This outcome reflects the earlier response on factors
influencing employment, as Delta’s FBUs are mainly destined for the local market as
opposed to DaimlerChrysler, which has a large export programme in place. Delta also saw
changing market focus as quite an important determinant of annual turnover, whilst
DaimlerChrysler did not volunteer an opinion. This is interesting, given that
DaimlerChrysler is increasingly becoming more export focused, as noted in Section 4.3.3.
It was difficult to ascertain the respondents’ profitability trends between 1990-1998, as they
felt this information was of a sensitive nature and, owing to their nature of ownership, they
were under no obligation to reveal any details. While questions relating to investment
expenditure were unanswered for the same reasons, it can be affirmed from Sections 4.3.2
and 4.3.3 that both respondents have in the past two years spent heavily on capital, in order
to meet the challenges placed on them by liberalisation under the MIDP.
5.2.2. Effects of trade liberalisation on assembly firms
One of the objectives of the survey was to determine the nature of the respondent firms’
level of integration into their parent companies’ global networks and whether this had in any
way resulted in increased exports since 1990.
DaimlerChrysler South Africa reported that, as a fully owned subsidiary of DaimlerChrysler
worldwide, it was fully integrated into its parent company’s network, and this had resulted
in increased exports of both FBUs and components.14 Delta is now fully integrated into the
global network of its largest minority shareholder, General Motors (GM). It reported
increased exports after 1995, especially of components, due to active lobbying at GM
Worldwide Purchasing, which sources components from all GM subsidiaries and affiliates
throughout the world.
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The survey also sought to determine the source of duty drawback certificates, which are a
feature of the Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP) import/export
complementation scheme. It was established that both Delta and DaimlerChrysler obtain
these certificates from the export of FBUs and components. In addition, Delta shares these
duty drawback certificates with component manufacturers which supply its manufacturing
plants with parts.
One other important question related to the benefits of the MIDP that had accrued to the
motor vehicle assemblers, namely:
(a) increased exports;
(b) increased employment;
(c) ensuring survival in the face of international competition;
(d) forcing firms to be internationally competitive;
(e) the transfer of technology.
Both respondents concurred that an important consequence of the MIDP was that the
assembly firms had been forced to work towards being internationally competitive by
investing heavily in capital expenditure to upgrade their assembly plants, as  noted in
Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. Delta further indicated that the MIDP had resulted in increased
exports of components due to the awarding of export contracts to Europe and South
America. Neither of the respondents, however, were of the opinion that increased
employment, technology transfer and the ensuring of survival in the face of international
competition were benefits of the MIDP.
The final question in this section dwelt on the adverse effects encountered as a result of the
introduction of the MIDP. The respondents both felt that liberalisation had resulted in
increased competition from imported FBUs. However, only DaimlerChrysler was of the
opinion that reduced market share, reduced local content and reduced employment levels
could be attributed to the introduction of liberalisation under the MIDP.
15One of the component exporting firms, Dorbyl Automotive Technologies, has nine
manufacturing concerns located in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage. For the purposes of the study, all
were considered as a single entity.
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From the responses to the survey, it can be surmised that despite the perceived ill-effects
that trade liberalisation is believed to have had on the motor vehicle assembly industry, both
DaimlerChrysler and Delta have integrated themselves well into their parent companies’
global networks and stand to reap the benefits of on-going liberalisation of the industry,
especially with increased exports of FBUs and components. These findings will be analysed
further in Section 5.5 with reference to the theory.
5.3 The components sector
As noted in Section 1.3, there are twenty component exporting firms affiliated to the
National Association of Automobile Component and Allied Manufacturers (NAACAM),
situated in the Eastern Cape, which were included in the survey. It was established that one
firm had since shifted its focus to the production and export of non-automotive items.
Three firms did not respond to the questionnaire and hence information from sixteen firms
was obtained for the study.15
5.3.1. General background of respondent firms
The vast majority of the respondent firms (62.5 per cent) are based in Port Elizabeth, while
18.8 are situated in  Uitenhage and the same in East London (Figure 5.3).
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Figure 5.3: Geographical location of component exporting firms
Source: Inte
rviews.
As noted in Section 4.4, component manufacturers tend to be located within close
proximity to the motor vehicle assembly plants in order to reduce transport costs, especially
of bulky or delicate parts. Figure 5.3 demonstrates that the majority of component
manufacturers in the survey were clustered around the Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage
metropolitan area (as are VWSA and Delta), while the remainder were to be found in East
London (home to DaimlerChrysler).
The survey  further established that, of the 16 firms, a large majority (62.5 per cent) had
only a single manufacturing plant, whereas 31.3 per cent  had between 2 and 4 plants.  Only
6.3 per cent of the firms had more than 8 manufacturing concerns within the Province
(Figure 5.4).
16One of the respondents, Shatterprufe (Pty), has since undergone a major ownership
change, with its majority equity stake being bought from its principal shareholder, South African
Breweries, by a foreign MNC. This is in line with the general trend observed by Barnes (1999:7-8),
whereby the number of local firms with local ownership is rapidly diminishing in favour of wholly
owned subsidiaries of MNCs.
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Figure 5.4: Number of manufacturing plants per component exporting firm
Source
: Interviews.
The nature of ownership among the component exporting firms varied from wholly locally
owned to subsidiaries of multinational corporations (Figure 5.5). It is noteworthy that, in the
Eastern Cape Province, the number of multinational corporation (MNC) subsidiaries or joint
ventures is somewhat lower than that of wholly locally owned firms or subsidiaries thereof.16
A likely ramification of this scenario is that the scope for technology transfer is limited and
restricted to design specifications by the MNCs; in addition local firms often have to pay
exorbitant royalties to the foreign MNCs (Barnes, 1999:7). As argued in Section  2.3.2,
MNCs are a conduit for the diffusion of technology, besides purchasing raw materials and
intermediate inputs. MNCs are also important in that they enhance skill development
among the local labour force.
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Figure 5.5: Nature of ownership of component exporting firms
Sou r c e :
Interviews.
With respect to employment, it is interesting to observe that none of the respondents had
less than 100 employees. 25.0 per cent had between 101 and 200 personnel, whereas 12.5 per
cent employed 201 to 400 people each. 31.3 per cent of the firms surveyed  were in the 401
to 750 employee category, while a similar  percentage employed more than 750 people each
(Figure 5.6). This is probably a result of the labour intensive nature of the components sector
(due to low levels of technological deepening), and further underscores the importance of
the sector to employment  in the Province. It is also possible that there were no firms with
less than 100 personnel because smaller firms do not tend to be members of NAACAM.
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Figure 5.6: Employment levels among component exporting firms
Source
: Interviews.
The survey of component exporting firms also sought to ascertain the annual turnover range
for respondents. It found that, for the Eastern Cape-based exporters, 6.3 per cent reported
an annual turnover in the region of R20 million to R50 million. 12.5 per cent of respondents
had an annual turnover of between R50 million and R100 million. 43.8 per cent had an
annual turnover between R100 million and R150 million, and 37.5 per cent an annual
turnover exceeding  R150 million, thus reinforcing the view that the automotive
components sector is of considerable significance within the Province (Figure 5.7).
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Figure 5.7: Annual turnover of component exporting firms
Sourc
e: Interviews.
In their various activities, component manufacturers engage in a host of production
processes, ranging from beneficiation of raw materials (which have a low value added) to
processes which give the finished product a high value added. The survey  categorised
production processes into beneficiation of raw materials, metal forming, machining/tooling,
die casting, moulding and painting. These categories are by no means mutually exclusive
since a single firm could engage in one or more processes. 
The survey established that 25.0 per cent of the respondents engaged in raw material
beneficiation while a similar percentage were involved in both die casting and metal forming.
For 18.8 per cent of the respondents, the principal activity was moulding, while 25.0 per cent
of the sample performed painting processes. Other production processes, such as electrical
wiring, battery manufacturing, glass production and the manufacture of automotive lighting
systems were the main activities of 31.3 per cent of respondents (Figure 5.8).
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Figure 5.8: Production processes of component exporting firms
Sour c e :
Interviews.
The destination of output from the component exporting firms also varies, with products
from some firms feeding primarily through into domestic motor vehicle assembly and/or the
aftermarket, directly exported or both. In the sample of component exporting firms in the
Eastern Cape, it was found that 25.0 per cent of respondents had their output feed through
mainly into domestic OEMs, while output from 31.3 per cent was destined for foreign OEMs.
6.3 per cent of respondents had their output destined primarily for the domestic
aftermarket, while 31.3 per cent of the sample had the foreign aftermarket as the main
destination for output. The survey established that 43.8 per cent of the sample produced
mainly for both the domestic OEM and aftermarket, while 25.0 per cent of manufacturers
identified all markets as the main destination for their products (Figure 5.9). This highlights
the importance of domestic assembly operations for a significant number of component
firms, despite being  involved in export activity.
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Figure 5.9: Primary markets for component exporting firms
Sourc e :
Interviews.
Firms were also asked to indicate their primary export destinations.  93.8 per cent of the
respondents identified the European Union as one of their principal export markets. North
America was a principal market for 25.0 per cent of firms, while SADC countries and the
rest of Africa each were principal destinations for 6.3 per cent of firms (Figure 5.10).
Countries such as Australia, India, Sweden, Brazil and other Latin American states were
other important destinations. 
These results may be compared with the components sector nationally (Table 4.12). The
survey findings reveal that, like the sector nationally, the European Union is the most
significant export destination. However, for Eastern Cape-based exporters, unlike nationally,
SADC countries and the rest of Africa are relatively insignificant in comparison to North
America and other countries. This could possibly be due to the fact that most component
manufacturers have, in order to  ensure their continued survival in the face of international
competition, entered into agreements with overseas (mainly German) assembly firms to
supply their global chains, hence most output is destined for the European and North
American markets. This finding also contrasts with the observation by Hosking (1999:13)
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that Africa is typically the export market allocated to component manufacturers in Port
Elizabeth/Uitenhage by their overseas principals.
Figure 5.10: Principal destinations of component exports
Source: Interviews.
5.3.2 Economic performance of component exporting firms
The second part of the survey for the components sector dwelt on the economic
performance of the sampled firms. This was mainly qualitative, and asked the respondents
to rank, on given scales, various aspects of their operations. 
The respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 (insignificant) to 5 (very important),
which of the following factors most influenced their employment practices:
(a) growth in domestic markets;
(b) stagnation in domestic markets;
(c) growth in exports;
(d) reduction in exports;
(e) demands by organised labour;
(f) change in market focus.
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This is illustrated in Figure 5.11.
Figure 5.11: Factors influencing employment practices of component exporting firms
Sourc e :
Interviews.
Figure 5.11 reveals that the most significant determinants of employment among the
component firms surveyed are growth in domestic and export markets, reinforcing the
importance of the domestic market for their survival.  While stagnation in domestic markets
was seen as fairly significant, reduced  exports have not been of much importance. The most
striking finding, however, is the relative insignificance to the firms of labour demands. This
contradicts the general perception that unreasonable labour demands usually drive away
investment in manufacturing. It is also interesting to note that none of the firms saw
changing market focus as a determinant of employment trends.
The firms were also asked to rank, on a scale of 1 (insignificant) to 5 (very significant) which
of the following factors most influenced their turnover:
(a) increased domestic market share;
(b) stagnating domestic market share;
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(c) decreasing domestic market share;
(d) growth in exports;
(e) stagnating exports;
(f) declining exports;
(g) change in market focus.
This is illustrated in Figure 5.12.
Figure 5.12: Factors influencing turnover of component exporting firms
Sour c e :
Interviews.
Once again, it can be seen that the main factors influencing turnover among the firms in
the sample are growth in both exports and domestic market share, while declining export
levels and domestic market share have a fair measure of significance. Changing market
focus, in this instance, is not seen as very significant.
The respondents were further asked to indicate on a scale of 1(for increasing), 2 (for
stagnating) and 3 (for declining) their firm’s profitability trends from the period 1990-1991
to 1997-1998 (Figure 5.13).
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Fgure 5.13:: Profitability trends of component exporting firms 1990-1998
Source: Interviews.
Figure 5.13 reveals a very mixed picture on the profitability of firms in the sample. For
instance, the number of firms experiencing reduced profitability rose sharply from1990/91
to 1991/92, fell dramatically in 1992/93, then rose again in 1993/94, only to decline in the
1994/95 period. However, from 1995/96 onwards (coinciding with the introduction of the
MIDP), the general trend has been towards a larger number of firms reporting decreased
profitability. These findings do not differ markedly from those of Barnes (1998), who points
out that, notwithstanding the fact that some individual firms have managed to improve
their profitability, the general impression is one of an industry under immense pressure from
competition.
These trends should be understood in the context of the effects of the MIDP, which in the
short term is expected to impact adversely on local component manufacturers, who, owing
to low volumes of FBUs sold in the domestic market, cannot compete with international
suppliers (Black, 1998b). This is because under the import/export complementation scheme
vehicle assemblers are able to source components from overseas using credits earned from
exporting FBUs.
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The survey also aimed to evaluate the level of research and development (R&D)
undertaken by firms in the components sector (Figure 5.14).
Figure 5.14: Percentage of turnover channelled towards research and
development (R&D) by component exporting firms
Source: Interviews.
From Figure 5.14, it can be seen that 12.5 per cent of the component exporting firms in the
Eastern Cape spent nothing on R&D, while the vast majority (62.5 per cent) spent between
zero and 1 per cent of annual turnover on R&D. Only 6.3 per cent of firms spent between
1 and 2 per cent of  annual turnover, while 18.8 per cent devoted more than 2 per cent of
annual turnover to R&D activities. The low level of R&D expenditure among the firms
surveyed is broadly consistent with that of South Africa’s manufacturing sector at the
national level, which is not generally known for its R&D activity. Joffe et al. (1995:239)
observe that, by 1995, R&D expenditure within the country stood at slightly more than one
per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), and was moreover heavily concentrated in
armaments and atomic energy. Duncan  (1997:171) adds that whatever little R&D took
place in the automotive industry revolved around adapting components to suit the local
terrain or changing parts to suit the needs of local assemblers. The relatively low level of
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R&Dactivityamong local component manufacturers may also be due to growing foreign
ownership, a factor which acts as a disincentive to expenditure in this sphere, since
technology can be sourced from the parent company.
5.3.3  Effects of trade liberalisation on component exporting firms
The final part of the survey attempted to evaluate the effects of liberalisation on the
component firms in the sample. The respondents were asked what they did with the duty
drawback certificates gained from exporting components. As explained in Section 4.2,
these drawback certificates were the result of export credits earned via the MIDP’s
import/export complementation scheme, under which component manufacturers could
either sell or share their credits with motor vehicle assemblers; alternatively component
manufacturers could export their goods through the assemblers, in which case the latter
would be the sole beneficiaries. 
The survey established that 31.3 per cent of the component exporting firms sold their duty
drawback certificates to motor vehicle assemblers, while 37.5 per cent shared their
drawback certificates with motor vehicle assemblers. 12.5 per cent of the firms stated that
the assembly firms benefited entirely from the duty drawback certificates, while for 18.8
per cent of respondents, all three scenarios were applicable (Figure 5.15).
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Figure 5.15: How component exporting firms deal with duty drawback certificates
Source: Interviews.
The respondent firms were further asked to state their perception of the benefits that the
MIDP had on their firms. They were specifically asked which of the following they saw as
benefits:
(a) increased exports;
(b) increased employment;
(c) ensuring survival in the face of international competition;
(d) firms forced to be internationally competitive;
(e) technology transfer had resulted.
This is depicted in Figure 5.16.
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Figure 5.16: Component exporting firms’ perceptions of the benefits of the MIDP
Source: Interviews.
68.8 per cent of the firms felt that the MIDP had led to increased exports, while 31.3 per
cent saw it as having led to increased employment in the components sector.  According
to 37.5 per cent of respondents, the MIDP was crucial in ensuring their survival in the face
of international competition, while 68.8 per cent of the respondents felt the MIDP had
forced them to become internationally competitive. 37.5 per cent of the component
exporting firms felt the MIDP had resulted in technology transfer. 6.3 per cent of the firms
felt that the MIDP had no benefits whatsoever, while 12.5 per cent perceived all of the
factors listed as positive spinoffs associated with the introduction of the MIDP.
The firms were also asked to identify any adverse effects they felt arose from the
introduction of the MIDP. They were specifically asked to identify which of the following
adverse effects they felt applied to their firms:
(a) model proliferation from increased importation of FBUs;
(b) reduced market share;
(c) reduced local content;
(d) increased competition from imports.
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This is shown in Figure 5.17.
Figure 5.17: Adverse effects suffered as a result of the MIDP
Source: Interviews.
The survey established that 62.5 per cent of component exporters felt that the MIDP had
resulted in uneconomic model proliferation, while for 50.0 per cent of the firms, the MIDP
had brought about a reduction in market share. This is significant, especially given that
with the restructuring of the vehicle assembly sub-sector, there has been an increase in the
number of model variants, which consequently raises tooling costs. With parts for these
models being increasingly imported, there has been a reduction in demand for locally
manufactured components. It was further stated by 31.3 per cent of respondents that the
MIDP had resulted in reduced local content, especially for the assembly sub-sector, while
43.8 per cent of the sample saw the MIDP as causing increased competition from  imports,
an inevitable outcome given the flexibility in sourcing of components. 25.0 per cent
identified all of the above as negative consequences of the MIDP, while 18.8 per cent
reported that they had not suffered any adverse effects with the introduction of the MIDP.
With the components sub-sector in the Eastern Cape being a microcosm of the sector
nationwide, it is not surprising that these findings concur with the general perception that
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component manufacturers have not benefited much from the introduction of the MIDP
(see, for example, Nicolau, 1999:19-20).
These results will be analysed further in Section 5.5, in light of the theory presented in
Chapter 2.
5.4 Employment
One of the areas where the survey for both the motor vehicle assemblers and component
exporters sought to elicit the views of respondent firms in the automotive industry was that
of labour.
The automotive industry has in the past few years witnessed a marked increase in labour
unrest, especially since the introduction of the MIDP, which has brought about reduced
levels of tariff protection and rationalisation of production, factors which labour perceives
to have resulted in job losses.  Respondents were asked to rank on a scale of 1 (for
insignificant) to 5 (very significant) the impact that labour unrest had on their operations
and ability to fulfil export orders (Figure 5.18).
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Figure 5.18: Automotive firms’ perception of labour unrest
Source: Interviews.
33.3 per cent of the assembly and component firms felt the impact of labour unrest was
insignificant, while 16.7 per cent saw it as having a moderate impact. On the other hand,
22.2 per cent of respondents felt that the impact of labour unrest was quite significant,
while 27.8 per cent were of the opinion that labour unrest affected the fulfilment of export
orders significantly. It may be surmised that the firms most affected by strike action are the
labour-intensive component manufacturers, as well as the assembly firms with substantial
export orders in place; component manufacturers whose production processes are more
capital-intensive tend not to have their operations disrupted as much by industrial action
on the part of their employees.
One of the major challenges facing the manufacturing industry in the country is to improve
the level of skill formation among the labour force. It is unlikely for the labour force to be
productive and innovative if the levels of literacy and numeracy are low, a defining
characteristic of South Africa’s labour force. This position is further exacerbated by the
fact that South African firms show a lack of interest in human resource development (Joffe
et al., 1995:188-189).
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Respondents to both surveys were asked to rank on a scale of 1 (for  insignificant) to 5
(very significant) their commitment to improving the skill level of their labour force (Figure
5.19).
Figure 5.19: Automotive firms’ commitment to employee skill formation
Source: Interviews.
It is interesting to note that, contrary to perceptions on the general disinterest South
African firms have toward skills formation, 50.0 per cent of the respondents  profess to be
fully committed to it, with 38.9 per cent  being quite committed to improving the lot of
their labour force. Only 11.1 per cent of the respondents were moderately committed to
skill formation.  While it is unlikely that a firm would indicate a lack of interest in
developing the skills of its employees, the findings nonetheless contrast sharply with the
contention of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) that
automotive firms perceive human resource development as a cost and thus are not doing
enough to educate and train their labour force (Cartoday,1998d).
5.5. Analysis of the surveys
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The purpose of this section is to analyse the findings of the surveys for the Eastern Cape-
based motor vehicle assemblers and component manufacturers in the light of the
theoretical impact of trade liberalisation.
At the outset, it must be borne in mind that the automotive industry in South Africa
evolved largely due to the import-substituting policies adopted by successive governments.
As noted in Section 4.2, foreign direct investment in  this sector was largely undertaken
to capitalise on tax concessions and production for a captive market, since importation of
FBUs was penalised by high tariffs.
As noted in Section 3.7, trade liberalisation in the automotive sector took the form of the
abolition of quantitative restrictions (QRs), and their replacement with tariff barriers,
which are in turn being rapidly scaled down with the ultimate aim of achieving a maximum
tariff of 30 per cent by the year 2007  (Tables 3.4 and 3.5). Trade liberalisation, long
advocated by neo-liberal theorists, is intended to allocate resources efficiently, with
countries importing cheaply goods which would have been locally produced at a greater
cost. Advocates of trade liberalisation also argue that besides reducing unproductive rent-
seeking behaviour, manufacturing firms are forced to become internationally competitive
by producing quality products which would withstand competition from imports. Diffusion
of technology by MNCs is also extolled as an advantage of allowing freer trade.
With the advent of trade liberalisation and the lowering of import tariffs, motor vehicle
assemblers have had to face the reality of increased competition from FBU imports (see
Figure 4.1), but also reduced local market share in domestic  sales, especially of entry-level
vehicles. However, accompanying this scenario has been a marked rise in the export of
FBUs, a result of the Eastern Cape based assemblers, like those in other regions, having one
form of export contract or the other with their parent companies or foreign shareholding
firms. The increase in exports has not only led to some rationalisation of models
manufactured but has also enabled them to take advantage of export credits earned under
the MIDP; as noted in Section 3.5, these credits have facilitated the importation of lower
17For instance, local assembly of the Golf IV, originally from wholly imported completely
knocked-down kits with no local content, now uses components such as safety glass from a variety
of local sources (Laing, 1999, cited in Hosking, 1999:17).
18One of the respondents to the components sub-sector survey, Precision Exhaust
Systems, was, for the seventh year running, one of the recipients of the 1999 General Motors
Supplier of the Year award, for achieving world-class levels of quality and technology (Cartoday,
1999c).
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volume, higher priced luxury models, thus freeing assembly lines for high-volume
production of fewer models. There has also been some form of technology transfer,
evidenced in the level of capital investment undertaken by the vehicle assemblers, and
very recently, some moves towards greater use of local materials.17
These findings broadly concur with those of the Industrial Development Corporation’s
Sectoral Prospects on Growth Guidelines for 80 South African Industries for the period
1997-2001 (IDC, 1998), which forecasts increased importation of FBUs following a lowering
of tariffs. With the current rationalisation of model lines and the envisaged trend towards
higher volumes of fewer model lines, stronger emphasis is being placed on export markets,
especially given that domestic demand for motor vehicles still remains insufficient (IDC,
1998:24.10). Envisaged integration of assembly operations into international networks of
parent/licensor companies is also evident.
Responses from the survey of component exporting firms reveals a somewhat different
picture, indicating that trade liberalisation has not been particularly beneficial to the
sector, reinforcing the view by Bell (1993), noted in Section 2.4, that the immediate impact
of import liberalisation is likely to be an increase in imports, with any stimulatory effect on
exports being delayed and possibly weak. 
While some firms have reported increased export activity and moves towards being
internationally competitive18, the general impression is that of a sub-sector under immense
pressure. Indeed, as pointed out by the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers
of South Africa (NAAMSA), the ultimate aim of the MIDP is to force restructuring in the
19South Africa produces 70 per cent of the world’s platinum, and about 8 per cent of the
world’s output of catalytic converters (Hosking,1999:13).
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local component manufacturing sector, to ensure it is more focused and has a globally
competitive range of products that can be exported; only those firms which are truly
competitive would have major export contracts, earning credits which would be used to
offset import duties on components which cannot be manufactured cost effectively within
the country (NAAMSA, 1998b).
Further, while the IDC forecasts for the components sub-sector envisage increased
volumes of a narrower range of components for domestic consumption due to the
production of fewer models, and increased export volumes to service vehicles in their
various destinations (IDC, 1998:24.15), the prospects for increased exports seem elusive.
With the possible exception of the platinum group of metals, an important component of
catalytic converters19 (which are increasingly being used in an attempt to lower pollution
of the environment), the sub-sector is still considered uncompetitive due to the high costs
of raw materials, not to mention distance from major component markets. It must be borne
in mind that with the current low production runs per model and model proliferation (due
to availability of a wider range of imported models), component manufacturers face high
retooling costs, which make the attainment of scale economies an elusive target.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter set out to analyse trends in the automotive sector in the Eastern Cape. It
found  that, by and large, it is the motor vehicle assembly sector which has benefited more
from reduced protection and liberalisation, especially under the MIDP. The firms in this
sub-sector have positioned themselves to compete globally by embarking on intense export-
driven manufacture of vehicles and components. The benefits of production for export
have far outweighed any disadvantages.
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The components sub-sector, on the other hand, displays trends that are consistent with
those manifested nationally, with most firms experiencing decreasing profitability and
declining exports, especially when liberalisation proper took off. This is evidently due to the
rapid decline in protection, which has made the sub-sector face stiff competition from
cheaper imports. Model proliferation and the fact that vehicle assemblers are able to
source components from overseas directly under the import/export complementation
scheme of the MIDP have further exacerbated this scenario. Thus, for the components
sub-sector, the costs of liberalisation appear to have outweighed any benefits.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Introduction
The automotive industry in the Eastern Cape Province, and by extension nationally, is at
the crossroads. Not only has this hitherto highly protected sector had the cloak of
protective tariffs rapidly removed, but importers of fully built up (FBU) vehicles have
capitalised on liberalisation to increase greatly the number of vehicles destined for the
domestic market.
It appears that the industry is struggling to retain its domestic market share while at the
same time trying to achieve a measure of export growth, without which it seems likely to
face a major crisis. Export growth has in itself proven difficult as the domestic automotive
industry, plagued by low volume output, geographical disadvantage and high production
costs, does not offer much competitive advantage when compared with other automotive
exporting countries like Brazil or Australia. Indeed, it is instructive to note that the bulk
of export activity, especially by motor vehicle assemblers, appears to be taking place as a
result of the local subsidiaries’ parent companies facing insufficient production facilities
overseas.
These factors, together with the findings that liberalisation under the MIDP has not been
entirely successful in making the motor vehicle assembly and component sectors
internationally competitive, pose a challenge to the industry and policy makers to ensure
that the industry does not face a premature demise.
6.2 Overview of the arguments
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As noted in Section 3.2, South Africa’s manufacturing sector developed through  import-
substituting industrialisation (ISI) behind a protective barrier of punitive tariffs and
quantitative restrictions (QRs). For the automotive industry, the result was an increase in
local assembly operations by overseas manufacturers producing vehicles for a captive
domestic market. Not only did this  encourage model proliferation and the uneconomic low
volume production of motor vehicles, but component manufacturers were faced with ever
increasing tooling costs incurred in an attempt to cater for a wide variety of models.
Since the early 1990s, there appears to have been a shift in thinking behind policy making
within the country. Current trade policy is broadly informed by orthodox neoclassical
economic theory. As argued in Section 2.3.2, the thrust of neoclassical policy is the
wholesale deregulation of markets, with the scaling down of tariffs largely aimed at
efficiently allocating resources and forcing industries to be internationally competitive. The
financial implications of this are that resources are saved by importing cheaply what could
have been produced locally at a greater cost. However, as noted in Section 3.5, this notion
fails to take into account the costs of transition associated with trade liberalisation and
entry into export markets, and the accompanying loss of employment occasioned by the
exit of firms from the industry (Black, 1993:220).
These costs appear to be particularly relevant for the automotive industry in the Eastern
Cape, where, as the findings in Section 5.3.2 indicate, tariff reduction and the liberalisation
of imports have caused component manufacturers not only to shed jobs but also to face
reduced profitability. The dominant trade union in the industry, the National Union of
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), has been at the forefront in criticising the MIDP
on the grounds that it exacerbates unemployment; NUMSA sees tariff policy as just one
leg of an overall strategy to achieve efficiency and economies of scale, and argues that it
should not be used as a means in itself (Kgobe, 1998; see also Hirsch and Hanival, 1998:39).
Whereas import liberalisation has resulted in a somewhat strong export response, especially
for motor vehicle assembly, as the results of the survey in Chapter 5 suggest, there are also
20One of THRIP’s notable achievements to date, which is relevant to the automotive
industry, has been the development by the University of Stellenbosch, in conjunction with Port
Elizabeth based component manufacturer Gemtec, of a Volkswagen inlet manifold for export to
China (Financial Mail, 1 October 1999).
21 For a detailed discussion on these and other initiatives by the South African
government in this regard, see Hirsch and Hanival (1998: 45-60).
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indications that many firms in the components sub-sector have been adversely affected by
trade liberalisation.
As seen in Section 2.3.3, the more heterodox or revisionist perspective puts forward a
strong case for government intervention to be selective in nature, motivating investment
in capability development. Moreover, as noted in  Section 2.4, it is argued that the role of
the state should largely focus on specific policies aimed at influencing innovation, diffusion
and enhancement of technological capabilities (Wright, 1995:15). However, the results of
the survey, noted in Section 5.3, suggest that liberalisation has not encouraged research
and development (R&D) or technology transfer, with any technological effort largely going
into the minor modification of parts to suit local environmental conditions. Technology
transfer has occurred primarily through licencing (and its accompanying royalty payments).
While revisionists do not dismiss out of hand the notion of export oriented industrialisation,
they argue that this should be largely limited to the provision of a framework for the
acquisition of technology, innovation and human resource development. It is encouraging
to note that South Africa has realised the importance of technology and has put in place
a host of initiatives, such as the National Research and Technology Foresight Programme,
Innovation Fund, the Support Programme for Industrial Innovation (SPII) and the
Technology and human Resources for Industry Programme20 (THRIP), all aimed at the
formulation of a coherent technology policy. It  remains to be seen, however, whether these
efforts will impact positively on the manufacturing sector as a whole, and the automotive
industry in particular.21
6.3 Which way forward for the automotive industry?
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The automotive industry in the Eastern Cape, and by extension nationally, is currently in
a precarious position. Many ideas have been mooted in an attempt to suggest ways of
ensuring the survival of an industry which is the mainstay of economic activity in the
Province and whose contribution to national motor vehicle output is substantial.
As noted in Section 3.6, the country has reduced its tariffs beyond the levels required by
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It must be pointed out that a return to the
previous high levels of protection and local content requirements as well as other policy
reversals are out of the question. Any move in this direction aimed at alleviating the
declining fortunes of the sector is likely to send conflicting signals not only to the
established vehicle assemblers and component manufacturers, but also to potential new
entrants into the industry. Given that the majority of players in the industry have based
their  investment decisions on the MIDP as it currently stands, any radical policy shift
could well see a wave of disinvestment which, for the Eastern Cape, would be simply
catastrophic.
It also seems clear that a secure future for the automotive industry lies in rapidly boosting
high volume exports. In the Eastern Cape Province, motor vehicle assemblers have
achieved a measure of success in this regard, with two out of three firms having definite
and substantial export orders in place, largely due to the fact that they are now well
integrated into their parent companies’ global networks.  At the moment, the same cannot
be said for the component manufacturers, however, for as seen in Figure 5.14, the general
trend seems to be loss of profitability due to increased competition from imports, a situation
which is likely to continue in the short to medium term before the sector’s trade deficit
narrows (IDC, 1998:24.15).
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the dominant association in the sector, the National
Association of Automobile Component and Allied Manufacturers (NAACAM), has taken
the initiative to promote its member firms’ products overseas actively in an attempt to
secure export agreements, as well as the facilitation of market access, technology transfer,
22Volkswagen of South Africa (VWSA), for instance, is in the process of phasing out the Golf and Jetta III Series in
favour of a production line wholly dedicated to the production of the new Golf and Jetta IV range, both for the domestic
market and export.
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joint ventures and financing, among other things. This is being done jointly with the
Department of Trade and Industry and is scheduled to take off in late 1999. It will be
interesting to see what results emerge from this endeavour.
Another alternative for the automotive industry is rationalisation and a subsequent thrust
into export markets, which would entail the cessation of low volume model production in
favour of high volume model platforms. As seen in Section 4.3, in 1998, the Eastern Cape-
based motor vehicle assemblers between them had eight different model platforms
produced locally. The internationally acknowledged benchmark for minimum efficient
scale ranges from 200 000-250 000 units per manufacturer annually, spread over at most
two models (Black, 1994:31). Since this is a measure which no South African assembler
comes close to, it stands to reason that rationalisation is not altogether an unreasonable
course of action. Model proliferation is still abundant, and has in fact worsened with the
introduction of the MIDP. 
While rationalisation appears inevitable for the industry’s survival, there is still debate on
how it should be carried out. Simply allowing uneconomic operations to close down is not
considered a viable option, especially in the Eastern Cape, where the level of
unemployment is very high. As seen in Section 3.6, the MIDP Mid-Term Review suggests
a system of incentives for motor vehicle manufacturers achieving a minimum number of
units per platform, and penalties for firms which do not comply with this number. This
appears to be a more feasible option than letting firms shut down. It is gratifying to note
that some of the Eastern Cape-based manufacturers have made headway in this regard,
by rationalising the number of model platforms in order to concentrate on high volume
production of fewer model variants.22
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Labour stability is another aspect that needs to be assured if South Africa is to remain an
attractive destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the automotive industry. A
study into the future of the automotive industry in South Africa observes that the
underlying causes of labour unrest witnessed in the industry, especially in the recent past,
revolve around wages, working conditions, employee benefits, retrenchment and to a lesser
extent participation in policy making and implementation (Cartoday, 1998f). While it is
accepted that labour has legitimate concerns, especially with regard to job losses
accompanying reduced tariff protection and the failure of the MIDP to meet most of its
stated objectives, the time has come for the traditionally adversarial management-labour
relationship to be discarded in favour of constructive dialogue. This is essential if the
industry hopes to attract increased FDI and persuade already established players not to
abandon the country for other manufacturing destinations.
There appears to be a fair degree of negative sentiment regarding the future viability of the
automotive industry both in the Eastern Cape Province and nationally, especially in light
of the perception that the MIDP has not met its intended objectives, and the spectre of
further reduced incentives once the Mid-Term Review is formally promulgated. The onus
therefore lies on all the stakeholders in the industry to come together and facilitate the
enabling environment which will be necessary to ensure the survival of motor vehicle
assembly and component production into the next millennium.
-121-
APPENDIX 1: LIST OF MOTOR VEHICLE ASSEMBLY AND COMPONENT
FIRMS SURVEYED
Assembly Firms
DaimlerChrysler South Africa (DCSA) (Pty) Ltd
Delta Motor Corporation (Pty) Ltd
Component Firms
Alloy Wheels International (SA) (Pty) Ltd
Armstrong Hydraulics (SA) (Pty) Ltd
Autoplastic (Pty) Ltd
Bosal Afrika (Pty) Ltd
BTR Automotive Drivetrain Systems Ltd
Dorbyl Automotive Technologies Ltd
First National Battery Ltd
GEMTEC (Pty) 
Hella (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd
Isringhausen of South Africa (Pty) Ltd
Kromberg and Schubert SA (Pty) Ltd
M&R Foundries Ltd
Payen Components SA Ltd
Precision Exhaust Systems (Pty) Ltd
SAMCOR Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd
Shatterprufe (Pty) Ltd
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APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE MOTOR VEHICLE
ASSEMBLY INDUSTRY IN THE EASTERN CAPE PROVINCE
SECTION 1  GENERAL BACKGROUND
1.1 What is your firm’s annual turnover? (Please tick the closest choice)
(a) R100 million to R150 million__________
(b) R150 million to R 250 million__________
           (c) 250 million to R500 million___________
(d) over R500 million_________
1.2 How many people are directly employed by your firm? (Please tick the closest
choice)
(a) 1000 to 1500 personnel__________
(b) 1000 to 2000 personnel__________
(c) 2000 to 4000 personnel__________
(d) over 4000 personnel_________
SECTION 2  ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF SURVEYED FIRMS
2.1 On a scale of 1 (for unimportant) to 5 (for very important), what factors
influence the trends in your firm’s employment practices? (Please tick all that apply)
(a) Growth in domestic markets_________
(b) Stagnation in domestic markets_______
(c) Growth in exports_________
(d) Reduction of exports________
(e) Demands by organised labour________
(f) Change in market focus_______
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2.2 What are your firm’s principal export markets? (Please tick all that apply)
(a) The European Union_________
(b) SADC countries__________
(c) Rest of Africa___________
(d) North America___________
(e) Other (Please specify) ______________________
2.3 On a scale of 1 (for unimportant) to 5 (for very important), how would you rank
the factors influencing your firm’s turnover?
(a) Increased domestic market share_____________________
(b) Stagnating domestic market share____________________
(c) Decreasing domestic market share____________________
(d)  Growth in exports_________________________________
(e) Stagnating exports_________________________________
(f) Declining exports__________________________________
(g) Change in market focus_____________________________
(h) Other (Please specify)_______________________________
2.3 On a scale of 1 (for increasing), 2 (for stagnating) and 3 (for decreasing), how
would you rank your firm’s profitability trends in the following time periods?
(a) 1990 to 1991_____________________________
(b) 1991 to 1992_____________________________
(c) 1992 to 1993_____________________________
(d) 1993 to 1994_____________________________
(f) 1994 to 1995_____________________________
(g) 1995 to 1996_____________________________
(h) 1996 to 1997_____________________________
(i) 1997 to 1998_____________________________
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2.4 What percentage of your firm’s turnover is channelled towards Research and
Development (R&D)?
(a) zero______________
(b) zero to 1%_________
(c) 1.0% to 2.0%_______
(d) over 2.0%__________
2.5 Labour unrest, especially in the 1990s, has been quite pronounced in the
automotive industry. On a scale of 1 (for insignificant) to 5 (for very significant),
how would you rate the impact of labour unrest on your firm’s annual turnover and
fulfilment of export orders?________________________
2.6 Skills formation is regarded as an integral part of human resource development.
On a scale of 1 (for minimal) to 5 (for very significant), how would you rate the
commitment of your firm to the upgrading of its labour force’s skills?
______________
2.7 What is the level of investment expenditure undertaken by your firm in the
following periods?
(a) 1990 to 1991________________________
(b) 1991 to 1992________________________
(c) 1992 to 1993________________________
(d) 1993 to 1994_________________________
(e) 1994 to 1995_________________________
(f) 1995 to 1996__________________________
(g) 1996 to 1997__________________________
(h) 1997 to 1998__________________________
(i) 1998 to date___________________________
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2.8 What is the quantity of exports of passenger cars by your firm in the time periods
enumerated in Question 2.8?
SECTION 3 EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON SURVEYED
FIRMS
3.1 To what extent is your firm integrated into the global network of your parent
company? Has this in any way resulted in an increase in exports? If so, why?
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_______________________________
3.2 An important feature of trade liberalisation on the automotive industry,
especially with the MIDP, has been the introduction of the import/export
complementation system. What is your firm’s main source of duty drawback
certificates? (Please tick all that apply)
(a) Duty drawback certificates accrue mainly from exports of
FBUs___________
(b) Duty drawback certificates accrue mainly from exports of
components________
(c) Duty drawback certificates accrue from exports of both FBUs and
components___
(d) Duty drawback certificates are mainly purchased from component
manufacturers__
(e) Duty drawback certificates are shared with component
manufacturers________
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3.3. What is your perception of the benefits of the MIDP that have accrued to your
firm, and by extension the motor vehicle assembly industry? (Please tick all that
apply)
(a) It has led to increased exports____________
(b) It has resulted in increased employment________
 (c) It has ensured survival in the face of international
competition______
(d) It has forced firms to be internationally competitive_______
  (e) It has resulted in technology transfer_______
3.4 Has your firm, and by extension the entire motor vehicle assembly industry
sector, suffered any adverse effects owing to the introduction of the MIDP? If so,
which?
(a) Model proliferation from increased importation of FBUs__________
(b) It has resulted in reduced market share___________
(c) It has resulted in reduced local content___________
(d) It has led to increased competition from imports___________
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3.5 Do you have any other pertinent comments to make regarding the
survey?_______________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_________________________
THANK YOU FOR HAVING TAKEN THE TIME TO FILL IN THE
QUESTIONNAIRE
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APPENDIX 3: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE COMPONENTS
SECTOR IN THE EASTERN CAPE PROVINCE
1. GENERAL BACKGROUND
1.1 In what part of the Eastern Cape Province are your operations principally
located? 
(a) Port Elizabeth_________
(b) Uitenhage____________
(c) East London__________
(d) Other (Please specify)________________________
1.2 How many manufacturing plants does your firm operate within the Eastern Cape
Province?( Please tick one.)
(a) one_______
(b) 2 to 4______
(c) 5 to 8______
(d) over 8______
1.3 How many personnel does your firm employ?( Please tick one)
(a) 0 to 100_________
(b) 101 to 200________
(c) 201 to 400________
(d) 401 to 750________
(e) over 750__________
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1.4 What is your firm’s annual turnover?
(a) R0 to R20 million__________________
(b) R20 million to R50 million____________
(c) R50 million to R100 million____________
(d) R100 million to R150 million___________
(e) over R250 million___________________
1.5 What production processes does your firm principally engage in? (Please tick all
that apply)
(a) Raw material beneficiation___________
(b) Metal forming _______________
(c) Machining/tooling_____________
(d) Die-casting__________________
(e) Moulding___________________
(f) Painting_____________________
(g) other (please specify)_________________________
1.6 Which of the following do you consider your primary market to be? (Please tick
all those that apply)
(a) Domestic OEM_______________
(b) Foreign OEM________________
(c) Domestic aftermarket___________
(d) Foreign aftermarket_____________
(e) Domestic OEM and aftermarket__________
(f) Foreign OEM and aftermarket____________
(g) All markets_____________________
1.7 What is the ownership structure of your firm? (Please tick one).
(a) Wholly locally owned________________________
(b) Subsidiary of local company___________________
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(c) Joint venture with foreign multinational corporation___________
(d) Subsidiary of foreign multinational corporation_______________
SECTION 2 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF SURVEYED FIRMS
2.1 On a scale of 1 (for unimportant) to 5 (for very important), what factors
influence the trends in your firm’s employment practices?____________
(a) Growth in domestic markets____________
(b) Stagnation in domestic markets__________
(c) Growth in exports_____________
(d) Reduction of exports___________
(e) Demands by organised labour____________
(f) Change in market focus__________________
2.2 What are your firm’s principal export markets? (Please tick one.)
(a) The European Union__________
(b) SADC countries_____________
(c) Rest of Africa_______________
(d) North America______________
(e) Other (Please specify)__________________________________
2.3 On a scale of 1 (for unimportant) to 5 (for very important), how would you rank
the factors influencing your firm’s turnover? (Please tick all those that apply)
(a) Increased domestic market share__________
(b) Stagnating domestic market share__________
(c) Decreasing domestic market share___________
(d) Growth in exports__________
(e) Stagnating exports__________
(f) Declining exports______________
(g) Change in market focus__________
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2.4 On a scale of 1 (for increasing), 2 (for stagnating) and 3 (for decreasing), how
would you rank your firm’s profitability trends in the following time periods?
(a) 1990 to 1991____________
(b) 1991 to 1992____________
(c) 1992 to 1993____________
(d) 1993 to 1994____________
(e) 1994 to 1995____________
(i) 1995 to 1996____________
(ii) 1996 to 1997____________
(iii) 1997 to 1998____________
2.4 What percentage of your firm’s turnover is channelled towards Research and
Development (R&D)?
(a) zero____________
(b) zero to 1%___________
(c) 1.0% to 2.0%_________
(d) over 2.0%____________
2.5 Labour unrest, especially in the 1990s, has been quite pronounced in the
automotive industry. On a scale of 1 (for insignificant) to 5 (for very significant),
how would you rate the impact of labour unrest on your firm’s annual turnover and
f u l f i l m e n t  o f  e x p o r t
orders?_____________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_______
 2.6 Skills formation is regarded as an important part of human resource
development. On a  scale of 1 (for insignificant) to 5 (very significant), how would
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you rate the commitment of your firm to developing skills among its labour
force?______________
SECTION 3 EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON SURVEYED
FIRMS
3.1 An important feature of trade liberalisation on the automotive sector, especially
with the MIDP has been the introduction of the import/export complementation
system. How does your firm deal with the duty drawback certificates obtained from
exports? (Please tick one)
(a) Certificates are sold to OEMs________
(b) Certificates are shared with OEMs_____
(c) OEMs benefit entirely from duty drawback certificates_______
3.2. What is your perception of the benefits of the MIDP that have accrued to your
firm, and by extension the components sector? (Please tick all those that apply)
(ii It has led to increased exports__________
(ii It has resulted in increased employment________
(ii It has ensured survival in the face of international
competition________
(ii It has forced firms to be internationally competitive_________
(ii It has resulted in technology transfer_________
3.3 Has your firm, and by extension the entire components sector, suffered any adverse
effects owing to the introduction of the MIDP? If so, which?
(1) Model proliferation from increased importation of FBUs_________
(2) It has resulted in reduced market share_______________
(3) It has resulted in reduced local content_______________
(4) It has led to increased competition from imports________
3.4 Any other comments which you feel might be of value to the research?
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__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________
THANK YOU FOR HAVING TAKEN THE TIME TO FILL IN THE
QUESTIONNAIRE
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